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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
TOM STOPPARD: HUMANINZING CHAOS 
 
by 
 
Elaine C. Pritzker 
 
Florida International University, 2011 
 
Miami, Florida 
 
Professor Michael P. Gillespie, Major Professor 
 
 The purpose of this study was to critically evaluate Tom Stoppard’s application of 
chaos theory and quantum science in ROSENCRANTZ AND GUILDENSTERN ARE 
DEAD, HAPGOOD and ARCADIA; and determine the extent to which Stoppard argues 
for the importance of human action and choice. 
 Through critical analysis this study examined how Stoppard applies the quantum 
aspects of: (1) indeterminacy to human epistemology in ROSENCRANTZ AND 
GUILDENSTERN ARE DEAD; (2) complementarity to human identity in HAPGOOD; 
and (3) recursive symmetry to human history in ARCADIA. It also examined how 
Stoppard excavates the complexities of human action, choice and identity through the 
lens of chaos theory and quantum science. 
 These findings demonstrated that Tom Stoppard is not merely juxtaposing 
quantum science and human interactions for the sake of drama; rather, by excavating the 
complexities of human action, choice and identity through the lens of chaos theory and 
quantum science, Stoppard demonstrates the fundamental connection between individuals 
and the post-Newtonian universe. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I accept chaos. I’m not sure whether it accepts me. 
Bob Dylan1 
 
In October 1989, Tom Stoppard gave a lecture at the California Institute for 
Technology entitled ‘Playing with Science.’ During this lecture, Stoppard argued that 
although his knowledge2 of science was general, he grasped it well enough to apply it as 
a metaphor (Nadel 457). It is in this spirit that the current thesis is proposed: Through his 
application of chaos theory, Tom Stoppard argues for the importance of human choice 
and action in the universe, and thereby foregrounds human will as a fundamental part of 
the chaotic universe and not merely subject to its whim. Stoppard intuits a connection 
between the characteristics of human identity and modern science. Uncertainty, 
unpredictability, indeterminacy, complementarity and the ultimate fate of the universe are 
of the utmost importance not only for chaoticians in a cosmic sense, but also for 
individuals in their daily lives. The proverbial flap of a butterfly’s wing has as much 
impact as person’s decision to take a cab and the ramifications of each are just as 
unpredictable. Although both are seemingly inconsequential occurrences, chaos theory 
and experience tells us that both have incalculable and unpredictable potential 
                                                            
1 (Anderson 98) 
 
2 In Tom Stoppard: A Life, Nadel explains, “the principle source of Stoppard’s 
understanding of chaos theory was James Gleick’s Chaos… Gleick provides a clear 
exposition of chaos not only in terms of scientific advances but in terms of the 
individuals who understood, often tangentially or accidentally how a science of chaos 
might exist” (Nadel 431). 
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ramifications. While the clock-work universe took the responsibility of action from the 
individual, chaos theory emphasizes the potential effect (and therefore inherent 
responsibility) of human action.  
It is the anxiety over the realization that there is no longer a predetermined course 
that Stoppard dramatizes in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead.3 He does not do so 
in order to suggest that their (or our) existence is meaningless or out of their control as 
previous critics have argued.4 In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Stoppard emphasizes the 
importance of action, and the ultimate responsibility of the individual for his or her 
action, even in a world that cannot be predicted. Foolishly relying on a predetermined 
system leads to apathy and indolence, paralyzing any inclination towards autonomous 
action. In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Ros and Guil’s inaction leads to their own quiet 
fate.  
In Hapgood and Arcadia, Stoppard takes a more direct approach by infusing the 
very structures of his plays with chaos theory and quantum science. Hapgood exhibits 
qualities of complementarity and questions the nature of identity. Arcadia’s plot structure 
depends on recursive symmetry, strange attractors and human action for its movement 
and development. In both plays Stoppard foregrounds relationships and sex, exploring the 
many ways in which our actions are informed by them. Stoppard is not merely 
juxtaposing quantum science and human interactions for the sake of drama; rather by 
                                                            
3 Because this thesis argues that the characters in Stoppard’s play are distinct from their 
Shakespearian predecessors, I will refer to the characters from the former as Ros and Guil 
and from the latter, as Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. In the interest of brevity, I will refer 
to the play by the shortened title: Rosencrantz and Guildenstern.  
 
4 Like Paul Delaney, Douglas Colby and June Schlueter. 
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excavating the complexities of human action, choice and identity through the lens of 
chaos theory and quantum science, Stoppard demonstrates the fundamental connection 
between individuals and the post-Newtonian world. 
A Brief History of Quantum Science and Chaos Theory 
According to classical physics (developed primarily from Sir Isaac Newton’s 
theories)5 the world functioned as a machine, deterministically propelled by cause and 
effect. In Chaos Theory and James Joyce’s Everyman, Peter Mackey describes the 
“nature-the-machine” model as a clock or an engine.6 Composed of parts governed by 
laws, Nature becomes “wheels within wheels” (Stoppard, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern 
60). 7 With this concept engrained in Western civilization, the notion that if it were 
possible for humans to somehow discover the underlying causes, to “pick the lock of 
Nature”, it would also be possible to chart all future events.8 Mackey exposes the 
inevitable problem with this view of the world: 
                                                            
5John Gribbin describes the power of these theories: “[l]argely on the strength of 
Newton’s justified reputation as the greatest scientific genius, in the 18th century, his 
ideas about light, as well as his laws of motion and theory of gravity were widely 
regarded as gospel” (Gribbin 41). Gribbin further claims that Newton “established the 
first scientific paradigm, or model, of reality. This showed that the Universe obeys 
precise rules, or laws, and that events as different as the motion of the planets around the 
Sun and the bending of a light beam can be explained by the application of these rules” 
(Gribbin 46). 
 
6 Gribbin depicts it as: “[t]he image handed down to us by the giants of 17th century 
science… ‘clockwork Universe,’ obeying inexorable laws” (Gribbin 46). 
 
7 In the interest of space, further citations from this source will be identified by the 
abbreviation: RG. 
 
8 An example of this is the famous boast by Pierre Simon de Laplace, one of the leading 
mathematicians of the 18th century.  He famously boasted that “given the initial 
conditions and intelligence large enough to perform the calculations, he could predict the 
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It inspires us – if intuitively – to trust that we can break the code of nature… No 
matter how daunting the challenge, our knowledge, our epistemology, can 
accurately define the metaphysical nature – the real qualities – of the world itself. 
From this concept arises universal determinism, which says everything is 
predetermined… The determinism, however, leaves us in a depressing condition 
if we want to believe in our own freedom (Mackey 3). 
As Mackey posits, prediction is possible in the determined Newtonian world, therefore 
free will and autonomous human choice and action become subject to the same 
predictable system. This idea of determinism becomes so engendered in Western 
civilization that even once scientific findings began to indicate that the binary of cause 
and effect that constituted the mechanical world was insufficient, members of the 
scientific community, Einstein included, were deeply skeptical.9 
 With the proposal of the second law of thermodynamics in 1853, William 
Thompson shook the Newtonian world with the realization that in the universe the level 
of disorder is constantly rising and the amount of potential energy is steadily diminishing. 
Before the second law of thermodynamics the clock work Newtonian universe ticked 
                                                                                                                                                                                 
state of the universe at any future moment” (Hayles 7). As Ian Stewart explains, “[w]hat 
we must realize, when considering statements such as Laplace’s is the atmosphere of 
excitement that prevailed in the science of the time, as phenomenon after, phenomenon – 
mechanics, heat, waves, sound, light magnetism, electricity – was brought under control 
by the self same technique. It worked. The paradigm of classical determinism was born: 
if the equations prescribe the evolution of the system uniquely, without any random 
external input, then its behavior is uniquely specified for all time” (Stewart 14). 
 
9 As Gribbin states, Einstein’s two theories of relativity are considered part of classical 
physics. This explains why “Einstein spent ten years of his life fighting a friendly running 
battle in correspondence with Bohr, trying to show up the failings and absurdity of the 
Copenhagen Interpretation” (Gribbin 19).   
 
 
5
merrily on, never running down. The inevitability of disorder in isolated systems10 and 
the continuous dissipation of energy in the universe11are two facets of the second law that 
the nineteenth century world was most startled by. In Great Ideas in Physics, Alan 
Lightman explains the trepidation many felt toward the second law,  
Historically, the notion of a stable and unchanging universe has always been 
appealing, and the second law upset many people, including scientists when it was 
discovered in the mid-nineteenth century. The second law says that some 
processes in nature are one-way arrows, never going backward, never returning 
the world to its initial condition. The machines are running down. The universe, 
on average, is dissipating itself (Great Ideas 61). 
The ultimate fate of the universe became known as “heat death,” and the prospect 
terrified the nineteenth century that had been raised with the stable, eternal Newtonian 
world. The second law exposed a flaw in the Newtonian clockwork model forcing the 
world to reexamine some of its most basic assumptions about nature. 
 Quantum theory sent shock waves through the Newtonian world, shattering the 
clock work model and destabilizing notions of certainty and perception. In the early 
twentieth century the world was ushered into an era of uncertainty and indeterminacy 
both socially, politically, economically and scientifically. At the end of the nineteenth 
                                                            
10 Alan Lightman explains, “There are many equivalent statements of the second law of 
thermodynamics: Isolated systems inevitably become less organized; the usable energy in 
an isolated system is constantly decreasing…” (Great Ideas 63). 
 
11 Lightman describes this phenomenon: “Heat can be converted to work only for so long, 
and then the process must come to a halt. Since heat is continuously flowing from hot 
bodies to cold bodies everywhere in the universe, as expressed by the second law of 
thermodynamics, the universe is gradually losing its ability to do work. The total store of 
usable energy is constantly diminishing” (Great Ideas 91). 
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century Max Planck, a leading German physicist, argued that light was not merely a wave 
(as previously believed) but made up of “quanta” or discrete packets of energy. Through 
his work with black body radiation, he realized that because quanta can be absorbed and 
released, they can also change form. Albert Einstein would extend Planck’s discovery in 
1905 with his own theory that light does not always behave like a wave – sometimes light 
behaves as a particle. This wave-particle duality forms the basis of quantum theory and is 
still one of the greatest enigmas of the quantum world. It was in response to the wave-
particle duality that Niels Bohr developed his principle of complimentarity. The principle 
of complementarity states that it is possible for matter to simultaneously exist in opposite 
states (light, for example, consists of both particles and waves). It also states that the 
observer, through the act of observation, ultimately effects which state will present itself. 
The mysteries presented by the wave-particle duality launched an inquiry that would 
change the face of classical physics forever.  
 The dual nature of light, along with the emphasis on the impact of the observer, 
led physicists at the beginning of the twentieth century to attempt to describe this 
seemingly paradoxical discovery; their work formed the basis of quantum theory. In the 
1920s Werner Heisenberg, an assistant to Niels Bohr in Copenhagen, developed a 
mathematical theory to account for the wave-particle duality. Around the same time 
Erwin Schrödinger also developed a theory to describe the wave-particle phenomena. 
Both theories made identical predictions, and together they formed the theoretical basis 
of quantum mechanics. Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle (also known as 
Indeterminacy) emphasized not only the role of the observer in an experiment, but also 
the limits on our knowledge and powers of prediction. Rich explains: “Either the wave 
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amplitudes can be known or the probability of the electron’s position can be assessed, but 
neither the position and velocity nor the amplitude can be known at the same time” (Rich 
26). It is impossible to simultaneously measure the position and momentum of a quantum 
object. This creates an immediate problem because in order to predict the future 
trajectory of an object both the position and momentum are needed. Because of our 
inability to measure both of these things, our knowledge of future trajectories will always 
be uncertain. Uncertainty or indeterminacy becomes a common fixture in the quantum 
world. The role of the observer allows for a certain amount of prediction; however the act 
of observing places limits on how much the observer can know – the observer will 
always be faced with uncertainty. 
 The phenomenon of the wave-particle duality of light and the role of the observer 
is most often explained with the example of the double-slit experiment. In a double-slit 
experiment, light is shown through a screen that has two slits. In one experiment, the 
observer uses a photon detector to determine which hole the photons traveled through. In 
the second experiment, the observer removes the photon detector. Our intuition tells us 
that the results should be the same, whether being observed or not light should pass 
through the screen the same way every time, but the results suggest otherwise.  Alan 
Lightman describes the role of the observer in a double-slit experiment: 
When we don’t check the slit each photon goes through, each photon behaves as 
if it went through both slits at the same time, as a spread-out wave would do. 
When we do check, each photon goes through either one slit or the other and 
behaves as a particle. Light behaves sometimes as a wave and sometimes as a 
particle. Astoundingly, and against all common sense, the behavior that occurs in 
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a given experiment depends on what the experimenter chooses to measure. 
Evidently the observer, and the knowledge sought by the observer, play some 
kind of fundamental role in the properties of the thing observed. The observer is 
somehow part of the system (Great Ideas 200). 
The double-slit experiment highlights the two main consequences of wave-particle 
duality: that observation determines the reality (properties) of matter and that 
indeterminism is inherent in science. Scientists have an essential inability to precisely 
predict the future events of a system in part due to the nature of their role as an observer 
and their inability to disentangle from the object they are observing. 
 Although Einstein contributed to quantum theory, he resisted the implications of 
Bohr’s and especially Heisenberg’s theories. Einstein was not alone in his skepticism, 
many physicists at the time (and even today) struggled with the implications of quantum 
theory and our inability to definitively articulate or even know the basic phenomena of 
the world. Alan Lightman explains, “Many contemporary physicists have essentially 
given up trying to describe the fundamental elements of nature by anything based on 
common sense. Richard Feynman has remarked that he can picture invisible angles but 
not light waves” (Alan Lightman, A Sense of the Mysterious 34). It was in fact the 
indeterminacy inherent in quantum theory that Einstein persistently objected to. He 
believed that everything should be deterministic and calculable; if it was not then that 
was an indication that something was missing in the prediction, nothing else. Einstein 
famously wrote back and forth with fellow physicists (such as Bohr and Born) debating 
the strengths and weaknesses of the new theory they had helped to create. In a letter to 
Born, Einstein summed up his feelings towards the quantum question: “The idea that an 
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electron exposed to a ray by its own free decision chooses the moment and direction in 
which it wants to eject is intolerable to me. If that is so, I’d rather be a cobbler or a clerk 
in a gambling casino than a physicist” (Mysterious 60). Until his death, Einstein refused 
to accept the uncertain quantum world and instead worked tirelessly on his own “unified 
field theory” – a theory which sought to unify the general theory of relativity and 
electromagnetism. With this theory Einstein hoped to expose the errors of quantum 
theory and to return the world to its Newtonian days when nature was predictable. 
Einstein believed in the determinist world and refused to accept that some things cannot 
be known. 
 Quantum physics revealed the indeterminacy inherent in the clockwork model and 
destroyed the pre-quantum notion of a passive observer. From this place of uncertain and 
indeterminate knowledge, physicists today still try to understand the most basic enigmas 
of quantum theory. In the twentieth century, uncertainty is not unique to physics 
however. With the social, political and moral upheavals of the twentieth century, 
uncertainty has crept into almost every facet of our world. Increasingly, scholars have 
employed cross-disciplinary tactics to examine issues in their own field. Within the past 
twenty years, a particular relationship has arisen between quantum theory and literature 
(most often post-modernism). Quantum theory’s emphasis on the power of the observer, 
the complimentarity of identity, the indeterminacy of knowledge, and our ultimate 
uncertainty in the face of the future has been appealing to a number of literary scholars. 
In his book A Sense of the Mysterious, physicist and novelist Alan Lightman argues for 
the fundamental connection between art and science:  
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The ambiguities and complexities of the human mind are what give fiction and 
perhaps all art its power…Science is powerful, but it has limitations. Just as the 
world needs both certainty and uncertainty, the world needs questions with 
answers and questions without answers” (Lightman, A Sense of the Mysterious 9, 
14).   
Lightman notes the common use of metaphors and analogies in both disciplines as a 
means of negotiating and articulating uncertainty. Katherine Hayles also explores the 
relationship between science and literature, in her book Complex Dynamics in Literature 
and Science she focuses specifically on the relationship between literature and chaos 
theory.  
 Although chaos has traditionally been viewed in science and literature as merely 
‘noise’ devoid of order or information, chaos theory (also known as the science of chaos) 
is based on the discovery that highly chaotic systems are actually rich in information and 
often exhibit some sort of underlying, though unpredictable, order. Hayles explains, “One 
of the new science’s remarkable discoveries is that complex patterns emerge when they 
are mapped into time-series diagrams” (Hayles 8). Chaotic or complex systems depend 
on strange attractors and recursive symmetry to make sense of the information. Any point 
in a system that attracts that system to it is an attractor; strange attractor occurs in a 
nonlinear system. Using Stephen Smales baker’s transformation metaphor Hayles 
explains, 
Imagine that the complex layering of dough in a croissant were infinitely thin. 
Points which started out very close to one another, as the folding and stretching 
continue, diverge unpredictably. Yet they continue to evolve within a confined 
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region. This conveys the flavor (so to speak) of how a strange attractor behaves 
when mapped into phase space. Its strangeness is now apparent, for it combines 
pattern with unpredictability, confinement with orbits that never repeat 
themselves (Hayles 9). 
Not only were these strange attractors creating order in seemingly disordered systems, 
but once scientists began looking for them they seemed to be everywhere. From the 
weather to measles epidemics to cotton prices to dripping faucets – investigators 
discovered that systems previously perceived to be hopelessly disordered exhibited 
strange attractors which in turn, indicated the underlying order of the system. Hayles 
notes, “The pervasiveness of strange attractors was both exhilarating and puzzling – 
exhilarating because it suggested that the idea had a wide scope; puzzling because it 
implied that systems which seemed completely different from one another nevertheless 
had something in common” (Hayles 10). But strange attractors only dealt with specific 
points in a system and did not seem to indicate how these patterns were emerging. While 
strange attractors are concerned with certain points in a system, recursive symmetry 
focuses on the general form of a system and the way it is repeated across different length 
scales. Hayles illustrates the significance of recursive symmetry: 
The importance of recursive symmetry to complex systems derives from the kind 
of perspective required to see the predictability that lies hidden within their 
unpredictable evolutions. Mitchell Feigenbaum was the first to realize that, 
although iterating a nonlinear function yielded unpredictable results, the rate at 
which the recursions occurred quickly approached the limit that proved the 
universal constant. This constant expresses an orderliness amidst the 
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unpredictability by showing that large-scale features relate to small-scale ones in 
a predictable way (Hayles 10).  
Recursive symmetry is crucial to understanding the extreme sensitivity of complex 
dynamic systems to small fluctuations. 
Chaos theory does not abolish order, on the contrary, chaos theory affirms the 
necessity of order in our universe while realizing that disorder is also necessary and 
between the two the universe generates itself. As Katherine Hayles argues in her book 
Strange Attractors, “At the center of chaos theory is the discovery that hidden within the 
unpredictability of chaotic systems are deep structures of order. ‘Chaos,’ in this usage, 
denotes not true randomness but the orderly disorder characteristic of the system” 
(Hayles 1). Chaos theory defies Western assumptions of chaos as merely order’s 
opposite. Hayles argues that a pivotal moment in the science of chaos “occurred when 
complex systems were conceptualized as systems rich in information rather than poor in 
order” (Halyes 6). Chaos theory repeatedly demonstrated a more accurate depiction and 
understanding of the world because it took into account the unpredictable as it unfolded 
along with the predictable. As Hayles argues, “[p]art of the change that the science of 
chaos has brought about is the recognition that nonlinear systems are all around us, in 
every puff of wind and swirl of water” (Hayles 17). Stoppard too seems to intuit this and 
in an endeavor to express the implications of chaos theory for human beings, he 
dramatizes the inherent similarities between individuals and chaotic systems and in doing 
so demonstrates the power of human action and choice. 
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Conclusion 
As the science of chaos continues to more accurately explain and describe our 
universe, the more it becomes a part of our lives. Widely considered a pop-oddity among 
fringe sciences, chaos has gained steam and validity. So much so that chaos has become a 
part of our everyday life. Pop culture is smattered with books, movies and television 
shows that overtly or covertly use/depend on chaos theory or quantum science. Even on 
an abstract level there is a greater acceptance of chaos and its implications. Academics in 
the Humanities have since discovered the benefits of adopting the principles of chaos 
theory for greater interpretive clarity. Though not always rigorously applied, literary 
scholars have achieved impressive critical arguments (of both past and present texts) by 
the metaphorical application of chaos theory. Though some remain skeptical of this new 
relationship between the sciences and the humanities, many see it as natural as the 
systems chaos theory describes. In fact, the very process of writing is infused with 
aspects of chaos and the importance of embracing this chaos is becoming increasingly 
relevant. American universities’ pedagogical practices for writing are increasingly geared 
towards a process based writing practice that embraces the inherent chaos in the process. 
In his book Engaging Ideas, John Bean rejects the outdated ‘traditional’ view of writing 
as “formulaic” (the student plugs in facts plus a thesis and yields a paper); rather Bean 
argues that writing is a process infused with uncertainty and chaos, and rarely develops in 
an ordered and structured manner. Citing the French word for ‘rough draft’ brouillon 
(which literally means ‘to place in disorder, to scramble’, is etymologically related to 
words for cauldron and vortex) Bean argues: “This metaphor suggests a writing process 
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that begins as a journey into disorder, a making of chaos out of which one eventually 
forges an essay” (Bean 16). Order arises out of disorder.  
As chaos becomes more and more prevalent in our lives, it is important to 
understand our own role in a universe driven by chaos. Stoppard puts forward his opinion 
in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hapgood and Arcadia. Stoppard argues for the 
importance of human action and choice, and the complexities of the individual lives that 
influence them. Although the complexities of every individual are compounded in a 
chaotic universe they are at least given the hope of influence. Though the results of their 
actions are unpredictable, they have the freedom to make choices and take action. This 
freedom is what saves us from being helpless victims of a chaotic universe. We are 
autonomous agents that create as much chaos as order. As Stoppard demonstrates, the 
most unpredictable entity in the universe is the individual. 
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CHAPTER I: SURVEY OF CRITICISM 
I am satisfied with the mystery of life’s eternity and with the awareness of – and glimpse 
into the marvelous construction of the existing world together with the steadfast 
determination to comprehend a portion, be it ever so tiny, of the reason that manifests 
itself in nature. This is the basis of cosmic religiosity, and it appears to me that the most 
important function of art and science is to awaken this feeling among the receptive and 
keep it alive. 
 
Albert Einstein 
 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead 
When Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead was first performed, the National 
Theatre was taking a gamble not only on a young unknown playwright, but also on an 
inexperienced cast and director. No one could have anticipated that this rag-tag play 
would be hailed as “the most important event in the British professional theatre of the last 
nine years” (Fleming 47). The initial critical response highlighted and emphasized the 
play’s absurdist or postmodern aspects, which in light of the period in which it was 
written, seems appropriate. Stoppard however, has flatly denied consciously infusing the 
play with the existential angst that marks many postmodern texts. He says that his “chief 
interest and objective was to exploit a situation which seemed to me to have enormous 
dramatic and comic potential – of these two guys who in Shakespeare’s context don’t 
really know what they are doing” (qtd. in Fleming 48). Stoppard does allow for an 
existentialist or absurdist reading while stipulating that, “[i]t has the right combination of 
specificity and vague generality which was interesting at that time. That’s why, when the 
play appeared, it got subjected to so many different kinds of interpretation, all of them 
plausible, but none of them calculated” (qtd. in Fleming 49). This “generosity” of 
Stoppard to open his text to any number of critical interpretations has only fueled the 
 
 
16
debate around the maddening questions of just what exactly Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern is positing about mortality, fate, and the very nature of truth and identity.  
It would be remiss to put forth an interpretation of the nature of Ros and Guil’s 
identity without acknowledging the long, deterministic history of critical responses to this 
very subject. Many critics point first to the three plays to which Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern owes a conceptual debt. The first is Shakespeare’s Hamlet to which 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern owes not only its plot structure but, as some argue, its 
sense of the meta-fictional. Like Pirandello’s Six Characters in Search of an Author, 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern deals with the relativity of truth and the multiplicity of 
human personality within the structure of the play-within-the-play. Alongside Beckett’s 
Waiting for Godot, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern seems to draw many parallels not only 
between the comic business that takes place in both, but also chance seemingly direct 
parallels between the characters (Estragon and Rosencrantz; Vladimir and Guildenstern). 
Critics have also argued however that despite these connections to established literary 
canon, Rosencrantz and Guildenstern lacks a certain aspect which fails to make it literary 
and confines it to the theatrical. Felicia Londré goes so far as to argue that Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern simply does not hold up as literature and should be appreciated as it 
was intended, on the stage. 
 Critics unable to reconcile themselves with the literary inconsistencies in 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern point to the intellectual aspect of the play as being both its 
virtue and its vice. Normand Berlin makes the argument that Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern only functions on the intellectual level, making it a critical exercise for 
Stoppard and the audience, but in the same stroke undermining the tragedy. Richard 
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Allen Cave on the other hand does not find the “parody” destructive (in the sense that it is 
“elevated to the status of high comedy”), but he does fault the lack of imagination that 
Ros and Guil must possess as an “ethical failing” of the play. David Cowart asserts that 
this idea of illusion that Stoppard toys with throughout Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, is 
not merely his method but his subject. However for Cowart the relationship that develops 
between Hamlet and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern becomes “inimical to tragedy” and as 
Berlin argued, ultimately eradicates tragedy as it was “classically conceived.” 
 The relationship between Hamlet and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern has focused 
much of criticism on the meta-fictional aspects of the play, particularly the way in which 
Ros and Guil function as characters. On the basis of the meta-fictional nature of the text 
many critics have drawn metaphysical conclusions. Douglas Colby makes two bold 
arguments in regards to the play’s metaphysical implications. He argues first that because 
they are characters they have no will power and are therefore spiritually dead. His second 
argument is that the meta-fictional nature of the play suggests that the audiences are not 
only characters in a larger cosmic drama but are also spiritually dead. June Schlueter does 
not argue for the spiritual death of the characters and the audience, but she does agree 
that Ros and Guil are characters and therefore are only obligated to perform. Indeed 
Schlueter later argues in “Postmortem” that Stoppard creates the “illusion of freedom” 
but ultimately Ros and Guil are bound to the “tyrannical power of the script.” 
The seemingly mystical way in which Ros and Guil are propelled through 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern has sparked a great debate around the idea and function of 
“design” in the play. In a world with wheels within wheels, Ros and Guil are caught with 
no apparent agency in or understanding of the world through which they are moving. 
 
 
18
Through the metaphor of a game, Jenkins argues that the world only appears absurd when 
viewed through the limited perspective of Ros and Guil, but when viewed through the 
elevated structure of Hamlet, the design becomes clear. The fact that Ros and Guil never 
get to see the larger design behind their lives does not indicate to Paul Delaney that their 
struggle was meaningless. Instead it demonstrates to him that their constant search for 
coherence implies a firm belief that there is some greater design to comprehend (as the 
audience already knows because of Hamlet). John Fleming refutes Delaney’s strict 
application of “design at work.” Fleming finds this line of criticism reductive in that the 
play’s message becomes human life helplessly dragged toward the unknowable 
inevitability which has been preordained. He argues instead that Ros and Guil’s very 
human struggle for comprehension redeems them from their “characterness” and that it 
conveys the play’s true message: that every human life matters, no matter how small. 
 In “The Game of Coin Tossing” Douglas Colby centers in on the opening scene of 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern (and the idea it conveys of there being two sides to every 
coin) as emblematic of the four themes he sees running through the play: all of which 
emphasize Ros and Guil’s purported lack of autonomy and identity. With the first theme 
(there are two sides to every story), Colby argues that not only is Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern the “reverse side” of Hamlet but that it is in fact complementary “the 
missing half that completes the Elizabethan tale” (Colby 30). Although he defines the 
second theme as “Ros and Guil are essentially two sides of the same person,” Colby 
hastens to point out that they are similar yet distinct (like the two sides of the coin Guil is 
“heads” or “the brains” and Ros is “tails” or “the ass”). While the third theme (Fate) 
leaves room for Ros and Guil’s deaths to be tragic, Colby concludes that because they are 
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characters swept up in a predestined plot over which they have no control, they have no 
will power and are therefore spiritually dead. Colby argues that the fourth theme (the 
complementary sides of Ros and Guil) suggests that this double identity extends to the 
audience and that they too are not only characters in some larger cosmic drama but ipso 
facto, they are spiritually dead. 
However, Colby fails to acknowledge that Stoppard goes to great pains to draw 
out two distinct characters. He does this right from the start by pointedly assigning Ros 
and Guil character traits. Stoppard uses the coin tossing to create a distinction between 
the two characters from the very start. Although both characters presumably have been 
experiencing the same “phenomenon” of a coin repeatedly landing on heads, their 
reactions are disparate. Ros’s response is complacent: “The run of “heads” is impossible, 
yet Ros betrays no surprise at all – he feels none. However, he is nice enough to feel a 
little embarrassed at taking so much money off his friend. Let that be his character note” 
(my emphasis; RG 11). Ros genuinely sees nothing wrong with this – he tacitly assumes 
that there is some reason this is happening.  
Critics who argue for Ros and Guil’s capacity for choice have most often pointed 
to the moment when Guil decides to reseal Hamlet’s death sentence, thereby sealing their 
own fates. Felicia Londré highlights Ros and Guil’s existential decision at the end of the 
play to follow through with their mission (to deliver Hamlet to England even though they 
know that he will die) as the most important nuance Stoppard added. Although Londré 
does not feel that this makes them tragic heroes (for her their deaths are meaningless 
because they fail to acquire self-knowledge), she does point out that without the anxiety 
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of the experience over that choice, they could not be the subjects of their own play – there 
would be no drama. 
The fact that Ros and Guil never truly understand their circumstance does not 
indicate to Paul Delaney that everything that has transpired was meaningless. What is 
important is that “they make continuous attempts to master the situation and comprehend 
it with the assumption there is something to comprehend” (Delaney, Theatre of Chaos 
34).  Delaney methodically refutes the criticism that has relegated Tom Stoppard’s 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern to the ranks of merely the existential or absurd. 
Referencing a number of critics (mainly Gruder and Brassell), Delaney argues that, even 
in the midst of their seemingly incomprehensible circumstance, Ros and Guil maintain 
the belief that there is some greater design (whether they are capable of perceiving it or 
not) and that they are “in an isolation amid a cosmic void” (Chaos 21). Delaney posits 
that Stoppard is not attempting to pass a moral judgment on Ros and Guil, rather he is 
trying to “dramatise their bewilderment before forces which they do not understand” 
(Chaos 30). For Delaney it is through their attempts (actions) to understand that Ros and 
Guil become the dramatic characters previous critics have denied them to be.   
Chaos Theory and Literary Criticism 
It becomes evident by even a relatively small sampling of critics that the 
mechanical view of the world is still deeply imbedded in most of the critical approaches 
to the play. Although Fleming’s argument that Ros and Guil are mindless pawns helpless 
to an omniscient pre-destiny is reductive, it is undeniable that without this notion of a 
“greater design” the play would ultimately read as absurdist. What becomes imperative in 
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resisting the timeless seduction of determinism is to remember that chaos theory does not 
eradicate determinism; in fact it is crucial to Chaos theory.  
Chaos theory merely affirms that although a system may have determinate initial 
causes – nothing is immune to chance or choice. The play balances the determinism of 
Hamlet, which gives their search meaning, and the indeterminate events of Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern, which gives Ros and Guil the dramatic tension necessary to be full 
characters. Without Guil’s constant faith that there is something to comprehend and that 
they are somehow missing it, the two become helpless fools battered about by the literary 
minds of Shakespeare and Stoppard. The prospect of a design gives them the prospect of 
purpose, the prospect to do something. It is important to keep in mind however that 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern is a design, one which is constantly referencing itself. It is 
this tension over their true identity and subsequently the choice they are presented with at 
the end of the play that is necessary for their ability to be subjects of their own drama. It 
is this existential turmoil which makes them the dramatic characters that they never could 
have been in Hamlet. 
Chaos theory offers the reader an avenue of escape from the soul-crushing 
determinism that dominates the play’s criticism. Thomas Jackson Rice argues that chaos 
theory, “springs from the discovery that chaos is ordered, that a vast array of complex 
and purportedly random phenomena, studied in sufficient detail, reveal deeply embedded 
patterns, designs that exist independently of the individual’s act of observation” (qtd. in 
Rice 84). Although chaos theory has been studied and applied to literature from a number 
of different vantage points, for this particular discussion Rice’s critique of philosopher 
Karl Popper’s stance on Chaos theory and its implications about the individual and free 
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will are central and sufficient. Popper reasons that the only way for human freedom to be 
possible “in a universe that blends determinism and chance” is an assimilation of 
consciousness and objective knowledge. Popper explains, “Our universe is partly causal, 
partly probabilistic, and partly open: it is emergent” (qtd. in Rice 86). The limit on human 
epistemology places the individual in a perilous balancing act between “phenomena that 
are deterministic in retrospect and unpredictable in prospect” (Rice 86). Therefore, 
Popper argues human reason is unlimited in regard to criticism but limited in its powers 
of prediction.  In any given moment an individual is limited in his or her ability to predict 
what will happen but has an unlimited ability to critically engage his or her environment. 
Popper’s argument demonstrates that both the lack of limitation and limitation are 
essential for human rationality to exist.12  It is this facet of Chaos theory that this thesis 
sees as being the root of Stoppard’s argument for the autonomy of the individual, and 
uses to argue for the agency of Ros and Guil in Stoppard’s play. 
Although Chaos theory may not satisfactorily answer all of the questions raised 
by Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, it is inarguably an early attempt at dramatizing a 
philosophy that Stoppard would expand in his later plays. Many critics have argued, in 
fact, that Stoppard comes into his own with Chaos theory in Arcadia (1993). In this vein 
John Bull posits: 
Where Stoppard had played with philosophy in earlier plays, here [Arcadia] its 
deployment is central to his establishment of what is, in effect, a political credo: 
                                                            
12 Popper contends that “human reason is unlimited with regard to criticism yet limited 
with regard to its powers of prediction; and shows that both the lack of limitation and the 
limitation are, in their respective places, necessary for human rationality to exist at all” 
(qtd. in Rice 86). 
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that the individual is more or at least capable of being more, than just a 
construction of the political state; that all ideologies will crumble in the face of 
individual will; but that the result is not an ungovernable chaos, rather a set of 
unpredictable patterns (Bull 150). 
Though directed at Arcadia, this “credo” can just as easily be applied to the problems 
presented by Rosencrantz and Guildenstern that this thesis attempts to address. Ros and 
Guil are certainly more than their “construction of the political state” – in this case 
Hamlet. 
In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Stoppard drops two characters into a complex 
system in which Hamlet represents a determinate reality from which an indeterminate 
reality (along with Ros and Guil) emerges along its margins. Because Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern is indeterminate it is not necessarily bound to its urtext. As Chaos theory 
affirms, even in a system that is initially deterministic, small differences can create vastly 
divergent outcomes, thus predicting the future is nearly impossible. Though Chaos theory 
and Rosencrantz and Guildenstern may seem hopelessly disparate subjects, there has 
been a substantial amount of scholarly work dedicated to exposing the similarities 
between this mathematical field and literary studies. As Peter Mackey posits in Chaos 
Theory and James Joyce’s Everyman, “[i]n postmodernism, quantum indeterminacy, or 
any other kind, finds epistemological, semiological, ontological and finally, metaphysical 
expression” (Mackey 12). Although Chaos theory becomes an inadequate method of 
analysis when fully applied to Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, this denigrates neither the 
elements of Chaos theory that are present nor the impacts that these elements have. 
Critics point to one of Stoppard’s later plays, most often Arcadia, when discussing the 
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relationship between his work and Chaos theory. However, it is arguable that 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern served as a drawing board for Stoppard to develop his 
philosophy of Chaos theory and to experiment with the application of it in theater. This is 
not intended to detract from the validity of the play or the characters. Quite the contrary, 
John Bull posits that in Arcadia, “Stoppard’s use of “chaos theory” allows him to argue 
for the supremacy of the individual in a way that would have gladdened the hearts of 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern” (Bull 147). Stoppard first endeavors to make this 
argument (as previously stated by Bull) in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and because of 
that, Ros and Guil should be viewed as autonomous characters that maintain their 
“supremacy of the individual” despite their imposing and deterministic environment. 
Hapgood 
When Hapgood was first published in 1988 it quickly gained the reputation of 
being Stoppard’s most “scientific” play to date. Audiences were baffled by the intricacies 
of Stoppard’s complex quantum laden plot. Although the play failed to gain much critical 
or popular success, critics still point to it as Stoppard’s technical drawing board for his 
highly acclaimed scientific masterpiece, Arcadia. However, the application of science in 
theater is not the only conceptual debt Arcadia owes Hapgood. As Paul Edwards argues 
in “Science in Hapgood and Arcadia:” “Science should, through the sideways slant of its 
analogies, illuminate the human world, and perhaps show it in a more intense and 
emotional light then could be achieved through more direct treatment” (Edwards 172). In 
Hapgood, Tom Stoppard explores how science (quantum science in particular) 
illuminates the human world. He explores the mystery that lies at the heart of quantum 
mechanics by dramatizing the complexity and contingency of human identity. He reveals 
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identity to be fluid and to some extent determined by the context in which a person is 
viewed.  
Like light, identity exhibits characteristics of indeterminacy and complementarity 
and is contingent on the observer. Stoppard makes a clear juxtaposition between the 
mystery of light and the mystery of identity, both of which require a ‘both/and’ 
perspective to appreciate. Stoppard argues for a ‘both/and’ perspective in a world in 
which the ‘either/or’ paradigm is antithetical not only to the reality of the universe but 
also to the reality of human identity - both of which can be said to have infinite and 
contradictory possible manifestations that only become fixed when someone observes it 
from a specific point of view. 
Through the quantum metaphor of complementarity, Stoppard brings the abstract 
concepts of the new sciences down to the most basic and relatable level: the complexity 
and duality of every individual identity. In his article Particle Physics and Particular 
Persons, Paul Delaney posits:  “That impossible reality – that light consists of waves if 
the experimenter looks for one phenomenon but of particles if he looks at it in a different 
way – becomes in Hapgood a metaphor both for the mysteries of the world of espionage 
and the even greater intricacies of the human personality” (Delaney 132). Delaney 
highlights the connection Stoppard makes between the complementarity and 
indeterminacy in particles and personalities. Through quantum mechanics, Stoppard 
argues not only for a shift from an ‘either/or’ to a ‘both/and’ mindset, but for a reverence 
for the mystery of identity and the universe. 
Critics of Hapgood have often argued that Stoppard is timid in his application of 
quantum theories and fails to use it to its full postmodern potential.  In “Tom Stoppard 
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and Postmodern Science,” Daniel Jernigan contends that “instead of embracing the 
radical anti-epistemology of quantum mechanics that would link his work to the thought 
of such figures as Nietzsche and Derrida… Stoppard can be seen to be offering a 
thoroughly classical interpretation of quantum mechanics” (Jernigan 10). According to 
Jernigan, Stoppard’s interpretation of quantum mechanics is more in line with Einstein 
and Bohm. Stoppard “imagines that a classical scenario that normalizes nonclassical 
behavior still persists. Stoppard thus avoids using quantum mechanics to its full 
postmodern potential and even appears to side with Einstein in his desire for a more 
explicable quantum world” (Jernigan 11). But Stoppard is not trying to make physics 
classical again, rather, he attempts through dramatization to demonstrate how principles 
of quantum mechanics (like doubling, complementarity and indeterminacy) are inherent 
not just in the universe but in the individual as well.  
Stoppard carefully constructs a plot which will not only allow him to explore the 
intricacies of quantum science and identity, but will self-reflexively reinforce these 
concepts. Katherine Kelly argues in Tom Stoppard and the Craft of Comedy, that 
Stoppard’s construction of Hapgood illustrates both “how a scientific paper and a work 
of art differ and how they overlap” (Kelly 155). Continuing with the metaphor of play as 
experiment, Kelly posits that the first act contains a failed experiment that leads to a 
hypothesis. The failed experiment is, of course, the mime in the first scene of the play in 
which Hapgood, Wates, Ridley and Merryweather attempt to discover whether Kerner 
has been leaking unauthorized information to the KGB. Through the botched mission, 
Hapgood, Wates and Blair realize that the person who has been slipping information to 
the Russians is Ridley.  
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The failed experiment leads to the second act which, as Kelly describes it, carries 
out the experiment developed by Blair and Hapgood to catch Ridley in the act. Stoppard 
explains, “In a normal spy thriller you contrive to delude the reader until all is revealed in 
the denouement; this is the exact opposite of a scientific paper in which the denouement – 
the discovery – is announced at the beginning. Hapgood to some extent follows this latter 
procedure. It is not a whodunit because we are told who has done it near the beginning of 
the first act, so the story becomes how he did it” (qtd. in Fleming 180). Jenkins describes 
the effect being that “with logical precision, Stoppard leads us through each layer of his 
theme to its human centre, and the rest of Act One deploys the uncertainties of espionage, 
quantum physics, and individual personality until they interlock at the conclusion of the 
Act in the play’s crucial equation” (Jenkins 187). This first act also sets up a number of 
motifs which Stoppard will continue to use throughout the play such as twinning and the 
indeterminacy of identity. Edwards argues: “twinning and doubling are at the heart of the 
analogy this play makes with quantum physics, by making the “uncertainty principle” 
concrete on a human scale” (Edwards 173). As Edwards’s argument suggests, Stoppard 
demonstrates how uncertainty is a fundamental part of human reality and identity. 
In Hapgood, Stoppard rejects the reductive ‘either/or’ worldview and embraces a 
‘both/and’ mindset in which the wonderful mysteries and complexities of quantum 
science are one and the same with those of human identity. Kerner gets at the heart of 
Stoppard’s message when discussing Einstein’s reluctance to accept the implications of 
Heisenberg’s Uncertainty principle: 
Quantum mechanics made everything finally random, things can go this way or 
that way, the mathematics deny certainty, they reveal only probability and chance, 
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and Einstein couldn’t believe in a God who threw dice. He should have come to 
me, I would have told him, ‘Listen, Albert, He threw you – look around, He never 
stops’ (Stoppard, Hapgood 49). 
Through Kerner (as Delaney notes) Stoppard implies “that the wholly unpredictable 
uniqueness of the particular individual constitutes evidence of the divine” (Delaney 129). 
Stoppard argues not only for the autonomy of the individual but for the humble 
amazement of the mystery that is identity. He will go on to perfect not only his treatment 
of science but also his argument for the individual in his most successful play, Arcadia. 
Arcadia 
When Arcadia was first published and performed in 1993, it was praised not only 
for its masterful use of chaos theory in both the structure and the content of the play, but 
also for the depth of its feeling. Having been labeled as a cold and unfeeling writer since 
the publication of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Stoppard finally dispelled such 
criticisms with Arcadia. Previously deemed an absurdist, Stoppard began to be described 
by critics like Paul Edwards as “a deeply Romantic writer in that the emotional heart of 
his plays has to lie in what cannot be articulated directly” (Edwards 172). As an author 
consistently accused of being “too cerebral” Stoppard had finally touched the hearts of 
both critics and audiences. Although Edwards opens his article “Science in Hapgood and 
Arcadia” with disparaging remarks towards Hapgood’s critical reception, he seems to 
tacitly agree with what he presents as Stoppard’s view: that Hapgood’s “technical 
successes were to be the foundation for the critical success of Arcadia” (Edwards 171). 
What Stoppard achieves in Arcadia is not merely sentimentally powerful or scientifically 
adroit; it is a melding of both modern science and universal humanism which 
 
 
29
demonstrates that we are not merely affected by the chaotic inclinations of nature; rather 
we are a fundamental part of it. 
Critics who have engaged Arcadia’s use of chaos theory have focused specifically 
on three aspects: that chaos is not randomness or chance; the importance of fractals in a 
chaotic system; and the unavoidable sensitive dependence on initial conditions. In his 
article “Comedy, Chaos, and Casuistry,” Ronald H. McKinney describes chaos theory as 
“concerned with examining the unstable behavior of non-linear, dynamic systems, those 
‘in which extreme sensitivity to initial conditions create effects that are disproportionate 
to their causes’” (McKinney 395). In Arcadia initial conditions (which may seem trivial 
at first) have an unpredictable yet significant impact on later characters. 
William Demastes argues that Thomasina’s “Geometry of Irregular Forms,” (now 
known as fractal geometry) is “yet another significant path of entry into chaotic, a 
butterfly-effect engagement of the study of morphology” (Chaos 92). Thomasina 
observes “[m]ountains are not pyramids and trees are not cones” and it is the endeavor of 
her new geometry to better represent nature. “Armed thus, God could only make a 
cabinet” she exclaims. Rather than just accepting this, as Septimus does, Thomasina 
declares “What a faint-heart! We must work outward from the middle of the maze.” 
(Stoppard, Arcadia 37). 
Using Stephen Kellert’s example of a jagged coastline, Demastes demonstrates 
that although nature “does not create straight edges but rather fractals” what is important 
is “the surprising self-similarity that nature utilizes throughout these scaled levels, self-
similarity betraying duplication because of small though rising adjustments at each stage” 
(Chaos 92-93). He argues, “[t]iny initial deviations result in natural diversity, but this 
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does not concede randomness because this morphological butterfly effect produces self-
similarity even as it produces diversity” (Chaos 93). Meaning that even in nature what 
may seem random at first glance actually consists of deeply complex patterns. Chaos is 
not arbitrary; it is constructed by an intricate order. Demastes argues that Valentine’s 
description of Thomasina’s leaf algorithm, “provides something of a sense of the rising 
order out of chaos, an order that will in fact be reproduced in larger scale in Noakes’s 
picturesque style, a landscape initially created by Noakes but then permitted to rise on its 
own, a wild (but not random), verdant Arcadia” (Chaos 98). 
Demastes emphasizes that the actual math involved in fractals is fairly simple. 
What is daunting however is the sheer number of computations necessary in order to 
reveal the “ordered, self-similar, scaled patterns actually produced in nature” (Chaos 93).  
As such, “[c]omplexity arises from simplicity, as order arises from disorder” (Chaos 93). 
Demastes contends that the nineteenth-century section of the play is evidently 
“suggesting that a Thomasina could have existed in 1809 because the necessary 
information was available and because the social inclination toward ‘irregularity,’ as 
attested by the picturesque style, was also culturally available though not pervasive” 
(Chaos  96). He also points out that Thomasina is not only intellectually and 
mathematically adroit but she is also “very much a part of her age in much the same way 
Galileo, Newton, and Einstein were part of theirs” (Chaos 97). Demastes finds this 
observation contradictory to the common conception of science as uninfluenced by 
culture. Rather, Demastes contends that “the history of science continually verifies the 
claim that culture influences science and science influences culture” (Chaos 97). This 
thesis attempts to make a similar argument.  
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In spite of her brilliance, Thomasina does not possess the technology to bring her 
theories to fruition. Demastes maintains that because Thomasina lacks the technology 
“Stoppard introduces the late twentieth-century counterparts to the nineteenth-century 
cast, including Valentine, the student of nonlinear mathematics, who provides regular 
commentary on the chaotic nature of nature” (Chaos 97). Valentine becomes Stoppard’s 
quantum mouthpiece. 
Susanne Vees-Gulani makes a connection between Valentine’s statement about 
chaos theory getting closer to “the ordinary-sized stuff which is our lives” and 
Thomasina’s continuous attempts to find explanations for occurrences in her world. In 
her article “Hidden Order in the ‘Stoppard Set’: Chaos Theory in the Content and 
Structure of Tom Stoppard’s Arcadia” Vees-Gulani points to Thomasina’s rice pudding 
analogy as proof that Thomasina is “…thinking about the irreversibility of processes as 
well as the movement towards larger and larger disorder, which is formulated in the 
second law of thermodynamics” (Vees-Gulani 414). Chaos theory is presented in the play 
mainly through the work of Valentine and Thomasina. Stoppard uses Valentine as the 
mouthpiece through which the audience is given the tools to understand “the incredible 
event happening in the scenes of the past: the development of chaos theory by a young 
girl, Thomasina Coverly” (Vees-Gulani 414). Thomasina realizes “the discrepancy 
between the traditional geometrical forms and natural objects.” She spends the three year 
time lapse (from 1809 to 1812 that occurs between Act One and Two) trying to find 
equations that would lead to natural shapes: 
Each week I plot your equations dot for dot, xs against ys in all manner of 
algebraical relation, and every week they draw themselves as commonplace 
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geometry, as if the world of forms were nothing but arcs and angles. God’s truth, 
Septimus, if there is an equation for a curve like a bell, there must be an equation 
for one like a bluebell, and if a bluebell, why not a rose? Do we believe nature is 
written in numbers? (Arcadia 37). 
Thomasina is appalled at the inconsistencies she sees between the magnificently complex 
world around her and “commonplace geometry,” and is determined to find a better 
explanation.    
Susanne Vees-Gulani identifies three “fractals” that constitute the structure of 
Arcadia. She argues that Sex, Literature and the Garden are the three major “fractals” 
holding the play together. She reasons, “[e]ach of them could be seen as a strange 
attractor around which the content evolves” (Vees-Gulani 416). Vees-Gulani maintains 
that in setting up the structure of Arcadia, Stoppard follows another principle of chaos 
theory as outlined by Gleick: simplicity. She argues “since the play circulates around 
similar themes and topics in all three time spheres, it is characterized by simplicity” 
(Vees-Gulani 419). Stoppard surrounds the central theme of chaos theory with topics 
such as sex, literature and the garden creating a unified structure.  
Vees-Gulani identifies the Garden as the third strange attractor in the play. 
Always under construction the garden becomes the “…symbol of the change from one 
period to another, namely from the Enlightenment to Romanticism” (Vees-Gulani 417).  
The garden becomes the perfect juxtaposition of the two opposing ideologies in the play: 
the rational order of the Enlightenment and the sentimentality of the Romantics. Vees-
Gulani attributes Stoppard’s use of the garden as one of the structural principles of the 
play to Gleick’s Chaos: Making a New Science.  
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In his article “Tom Stoppard and ‘Postmodern Science” Daniel Jernigan examines 
Tom Stoppard’s employment of chaos theory and quantum mechanics in an effort to 
fairly assess whether or not his work can be considered postmodern. Jernigan focuses 
specifically on Hapgood and Arcadia reasoning that although these two plays are not as 
“theatrically experimental as Stoppard’s earlier work, they nonetheless engage the 
concerns of the postmodern era in their adoption of theoretical science” (Jernigan 3). 
Jernigan’s connection between postmodernism and quantum mechanics is based on the 
explanation given by Jean-François Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition: A Report on 
Knowledge. He argues, “Lyotard recognizes both quantum mechanics and especially 
chaos theory as the postmodern theories par excellence, given their radical incredulity 
over the possibility of achieving a grand metanarrative description of the universe” 
(Jernigan 4).  
Jernigan emphasizes that what distinguishes both quantum mechanics and 
postmodernism from their ideological predecessors is their rejection of and incredulity 
towards a universal scientific or “meta” narrative of reality. He argues that Stoppard is 
not a postmodernist because he does not use quantum mechanics to its postmodern 
effect.13 But by assuming that Stoppard is merely “normalizing” chaos theory, Jernigan 
misses one of the most important and intriguing facets of the play. Although a more 
ambiguous ending may have adhered more closely to the postmodern paradigm, it would 
have failed to deliver the play’s true message: that we are not helplessly caught in an 
                                                            
13 Jernigan dismissively comments that “Stoppard’s investigation into these theories 
seeks to normalize them according to a classical interpretation rather than to revel in their 
anti-epistemological implications” (Jernigan 4).  
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unpredictable universe over which we have no control, rather that we are a part of an 
exceedingly complex and dynamic system in which (although not always predictable) 
order eventually emerges. 
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CHAPTER II: THE PARALYSIS OF THE NEWTONIAN MIND 
 
Deep in the human consciousness is a pervasive need for a logical universe that makes 
sense. But the real universe is always one step beyond logic. 
Frank Herbert 
 
In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern Stoppard explores the problem: how do we act 
in a world that is no longer predictable? The implications of Heisenberg and Bohr’s 
discoveries were staggering to these men and women of science. Suddenly the universe 
was no longer knowable. Gone was the clock and all of its neat and orderly parts. There 
was no lock to pick – the universe was a writhing mass of possibility and the best these 
scientists could hope for was an educated guess. This revelation not only shook their 
logic, it shook their faith.  
Ros and Guil are doomed not because of their predetermined fate in Hamlet (as 
previous critics have suggested) but because of Guil’s refusal to accept the responsibility 
of action in a world which is fraught with uncertainty. For Stoppard, the Newtonian 
worldview robs the individual of their freedom of choice and action, incapacitating them 
through fear of uncertainty. To say that Ros and Guil do not have lives outside of Hamlet 
becomes problematic once the two are compared side by side. Although Ros and Guil’s 
“lives” are bounded by Stoppard’s play (as any characters of fiction are) their experiences 
are not limited by Shakespeare’s. In determining how (and if) Stoppard’s characters 
diverge, it is imperative to understand the characters first presented by Shakespeare. 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are introduced in the beginning of Act 2 Scene 2 of 
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Hamlet. The first 40 lines of dialogue between the King, the Queen, Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern are nearly replicated in Stoppard’s Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead. 
The differences between the two sets of dialogue emerge within the margins (within the 
parentheses of the stage direction.) 
 The scene as presented by Shakespeare is a seemingly simple one: the King and 
the Queen welcome two courtiers, childhood friends of their son, whom they have 
summoned to assist them in understanding what is plaguing Prince Hamlet. And yet 
beneath this presumably straightforward scene is a roiling mass of complexities and 
ambiguities. What are the King and Queen’s real motivations? Why have Rosencrantz 
and Guildenstern agreed to spy on their friend? Is there anything even really wrong with 
Hamlet? These are the very things on which Ros and Guil ponder while in the margins of 
Stoppard’s play. Although parts of Ros and Guil’s reality are determined by Hamlet, Ros 
and Guil are not. Their characters and experiences remain distinct, even as they 
seemingly melt into one another. 
 In Hamlet Rosencrantz and Guildenstern make their next appearance towards the 
end of Act 2 Scene 2. This scene, in which the two courtiers try to glean Hamlet’s 
afflictions, is discussed rather than presented in Stoppard’s play. Though Stoppard’s 
audience catches the first few exchanges and the last few, the bulk of the discussion is 
left to be recapitulated by Ros and Guil. In Hamlet this scene is the first if not longest 
instance of sustained dialogue between Rosencrantz and Guildenstern and any of the 
other characters. The two remain on stage for three hundred and ten lines during which 
Hamlet confronts the two courtiers, Polonious introduces the Player, and Hamlet arranges 
the dumb show, The Murder of Gonzago. Although Ros and Guil are not present for all of 
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this during Stoppard’s play (Hamlet goes off-stage with Polonious to meet the Player and 
then returns with the Player) a close look at this scene reveals that although they 
inevitably speak the same lines when they encounter Hamlet, Ros and Guil are hardly 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. 
 In Shakespeare’s play, Hamlet greets Rosencrantz and Guildenstern not only in a 
friendly manner, but in almost jovial relief: “My [excellent] good friends! How dost thou 
Guildenstern? Ah, Rosencrantz! Good lads, how do you both?” (Hamlet II.ii.221-223). 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern reply mildly but Hamlet persists jocularly, almost giddy by 
the presence of his friends: 
 Rosencrantz: As the indifferent children of the earth. 
 Guildenstern: Happy, in that we are not [over-]happy, on Fortune’s [cap] we are 
not the very button. 
Hamlet: Nor the soles of her shoes? 
Rosencrantz: Neither, my lord. 
Hamlet: Than you live about her waist, or in the middle of her favors? 
Guildenstern: Faith, in her privates we. 
Hamlet: In secret parts of Fortune? O, most true, she is a strumpet. What news? 
(Hamlet II.ii.224-233). 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are vague in their answers; it is only Hamlet’s 
goading which finally elicits the saucy response from Guildenstern (one that in 
Stoppard’s play would be more likely to come out of Ros’s mouth than Guil’s) – which 
demonstrates the fact that these men are actually good friends who know each other fairly 
well. Presumably it is this familiarity which causes Hamlet to check his enthusiasm in 
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greeting his friends and to doubt Rosencrantz’s evasive answer. When Hamlet first 
suspects that Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are there on the behest of the King and Queen 
is unclear; what is clear however is that Hamlet is put on guard during their brief 
conversation. When Hamlet calls Rosencrantz on his fib and asks the pointed question: 
“But your news is not true. Let me question you in particular. What have you, my good 
friends deserv’d at the hands of Fortune that she sends you to prison hither?” (Hamlet 
II.ii.235-238). Whether or not Hamlet was suspicious of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern’s 
motives before their arrival, their behavior (coupled with his pre-existing paranoia) is 
enough to convince Hamlet that their presence is not merely a happy coincidence. Over 
the course of the next forty-seven lines Hamlet reposes the same question four times. 
Each time Rosencrantz and Guildenstern evade the question. He questions them casually, 
“[b]ut in the beaten way of friendship, what make you at Elsinore”; politely, “[w]ere you 
not sent for? Is it your own inclining? Is it a free visitation?”; directly, “[y]ou were sent 
for, and there is a kind of confession in your looks… I know the good King and Queen 
have sent for you”; and finally, exasperated, Hamlet pleads, 
“[b]ut let me conjure you, by the rights of our fellowship, by the consonancy of 
our youth, by the obligation of our ever-preserv’d love, and by what more dear a 
better proposer can charge you withal, be even and direct with me, whether you 
were sent for or no!” (Hamlet II.ii.264-280). 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern have been stalling up to this point and even after Hamlet 
has appealed to their friendship – the two hesitate. Rosencrantz tries to subtly consult 
Guildenstern, “[w]hat say you” but he fails in evading Hamlet’s attention: “[n]ay then I 
have an eye of you! – If you love me, hold not off” (Hamlet II. Ii. 284-286). It is 
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Guildenstern who finally admits, “[m]y lord, we were sent for” (Hamlet II.ii.287). 
Hamlet does not press them to explicitly divulge their orders and Rosencrantz quickly 
diverts Hamlet’s attention to the tragedians. When read next to the opening scene of 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, it is difficult to believe that critics have persisted in 
conflating the flat, insidious pair of Shakespeare’s play with the perplexed, yet persistent 
duo presented by Stoppard. 
Like many of the great Western classical thinkers, Guil searches for some 
intuitive order in the world around him, and yet like many modern thinkers, Guil seems 
to be vaguely aware that if his world is determined he can have no influence in it. Guil 
struggles with the very problems Mackey presents as the products of universal 
determinism.14 Guil searches for the structure of the world he finds himself in but the 
more he searches the more he forfeits his freedom to act.  When the Player arrives Guil 
pushes him to explain why he has come. What Guil really wants to know is how the 
Player knows to come. The failure of the coins to act according to the laws of probability 
has robbed Guil of certainty in his own actions. In asking the Player whether it was fate 
or chance that brought them there, Guil is really asking what forcers are responsible for 
his circumstance. However, when the Player asserts that they have no control, “Oh yes. 
We have no control. Tonight we play to the court. Or the night after. Or the tavern. Or 
not” (RG 25). Guil reacts by desperately asserting his autonomy from any deterministic 
system: “I have influence!” (RG 26).  
Rather than embracing the chaos (as Ros arguably does) Guil resists the reality of 
what is happening by applying scientific methods of logic and reasoning to the 
                                                            
14 See Mackey quote on p. 5.  
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phenomenon at hand, thereby distancing himself emotionally from the situation. Guil 
constantly tries to make sense of the world around him through scientific methods. At the 
beginning of the play the run of heads in the coin toss offends Guil’s logical and rational 
sensibilities. Guil’s application and ultimate rejection of possible theories mirror the 
frustrations experienced by scientists like Einstein who struggled to resolve the apparent 
randomness of quantum science with the classically determined universe to which they 
had grown accustomed. Guil shares this struggle to accept the fact that his world is no 
longer predictable. Guil posits, “A weaker man might be moved to re-examine his faith, 
if in nothing else at least in the law of probability” (RG 12). With each failed explanation 
it becomes harder for Guil to suppress his rising panic or understand the implications of 
what is going on around him. 
Ros accepts things as they come, a willing participant in the chaotic world in 
which he finds himself; while Guil struggles to predict what will come next and what 
their move should be rather than reacting to situations as they occur. While Guil is 
tempted to reexamine his faith in the basic functioning of the universe, Ros does not seem 
concerned with the lack of determinism or probability. The straight run of heads amuses 
Ros, perhaps because he is winning, but also because he sees nothing alarming in the 
pattern: 
Guil: No questions? Not even a pause? 
Ros: You spun them yourself. 
Guil: Not a flicker of doubt? 
Ros: (aggrieved, aggressive) Well, I won – didn’t I? (RG 17). 
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Guil expects there to be a predictable pattern of heads and tails because that is what the 
laws of probability tell him to expect.  
Guil’s tendency to over think and analyze rather than experience and react to the 
situation at hand prevents him from making the right decision on the ship and seals the 
fates for the characters of both plays. Stoppard seems to be juxtaposing the two 
ideologies which struggled over chaos theory. Guil is representative of the residual 
classical interpretation of the world, while Ros (and the Player) represent the emergent 
quantum view which embraces chaos and the indeterminate aspects of the universe. 
Through the actions of both characters Stoppard seems to argue against the classical 
interpretation of the universe as inimical to the supremacy to the individual and the 
freedom to choose. 
 While Guil struggles to understand the nature of the reality he finds himself in, 
the Player does not seem to be burdened by the same existential dilemmas. In an 
indeterminate world the best one can hope for is an educated guess of future events but 
Guil does not like to be unprepared. When the Player describes the different 
performances Ros and Guil can take part in Guil is scandalized by the vulgarity of the 
performances. Guil is so appalled that he reacts with physical violence by “smashing the 
Player across the face” (RG 26). Guil is offended not only by the obscene nature of what 
the Player presents but by the surprise. Based on his classical view of the world it is not 
how Guil expects the players to behave:  
(shaking with rage and fright): It could have been – it didn’t have to be obscene… 
It could have been – a bird out of season, dropping bright-feathered on my 
shoulder… It could have been a tongueless dwarf standing by the road to point the 
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way… I was prepared. But it’s this, is it? No enigma, no dignity, nothing 
classical15, portentous, only this – a comic pornographer and a rabble of 
prostitutes… (RG 27). 
What really seems to disturb Guil however is the assuredness with which the Player 
travels through the world.  
Ros, on the other hand, does not seem alarmed by the players’ appearance. Rather 
than looking for the pattern, Ros reacts to the changes in his environment. Instead of 
creating an intellectual distance between himself and his reality, Ros is able to truly be in 
the moment and react rather than struggling to predict. Comically, Ros’s reaction to the 
Player’s proposition is the antithesis of Guil’s. Rather than being shocked and disgusted, 
Ros is titillated and intrigued. 
 The dual nature of the Player as a character of both Hamlet and Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern allows him to hold a world view more in line with chaos than any classical 
interpretation. If Rosencrantz and Guildenstern exists in the margins of Hamlet then the 
Player represents the point at which the two become blurred. While Ros and Guil are 
excluded for the most part from the Hamlet frame story, the Player moves easily between 
the two in a self-assured way that infuriates Guil. 
 Guil: Well… aren’t you going to change into your costume? 
 Player: I never change out of it, sir. 
 Guil: Always in character. 
 Player: That’s it. 
  Pause 
                                                            
15 My emphasis. 
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 Guil: Aren’t you going to – come on? 
 Player: I am on. 
 Guil: But if you are on, you can’t come on. Can you? 
 Player: I start on (RG 34). 
When the Player asserts that they have no control he is acknowledging the limitation of 
human epistemology to have a total fixed world view which allows him to predict the 
trajectory of his future. He embraces the many roles we all play and the fact that at any 
given moment we are all characters adapting to different scenes. Though the Player has 
been criticized as the most absurd character in the play, he is not extending a nihilistic 
view of a meaningless and random universe. He instead embraces whatever role the 
situation calls for and embraces the chance and randomness of his world with the 
conviction that order will inevitably arise out of disorder. This is an idea which Stoppard 
later explores in Hapgood.  
 Guil decides that he has no choice because of his fear of participation in an 
unpredictable and chaotic world: “At least we are presented with alternatives… but not 
choice” (RG 39). Guil refuses to accept that they have an option to choose. According to 
his pre-determined worldview the decision has been made and should be part of a 
predictable pattern of actions that he can logically deduce. However, as chaos theory 
affirms, the world is not always logical or predictable and though a pattern may later 
become apparent, it is impossible for human beings as a part of this spontaneous pattern 
to understand the pattern as it evolves. Once the pair encounters the Hamlet characters, 
Guil is willing to relinquish any responsibility for action:  
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There’s a logic at work – it’s all done for you, don’t worry. Enjoy it. Relax. To be 
taken in hand and led, like a child again, even without innocence, a child – it’s 
like being given a prize, an extra slice of childhood when you least expect it, as a 
prize for being good, or compensation for never having had one… (RG 40).  
Guil is more than happy to relinquish his control to a predetermined reality. When events 
are predetermined one is relieved of the burden of choice like a child who relies on the 
decisions of his or her parents. The problem with this mode of thinking (Stoppard seems 
to suggest) is that because of chaos theory we now know that the world is not 
predetermined and we are part of a chaotic universe which requires us to act in order to 
effect change. As much as individuals are affected by chaos, as a part of the chaotic 
universe they have the potential for unpredictability and choice. 
 In a role-reversal from the previous scene, Ros has been prompted to action by 
their circumstance and Guil (now complacent at the slightest hint of a pre-determined 
path) is indifferent to any action outside of that: “Words, words. They’re all we have to 
go on” (RG 41). Ultimately it is this complacency and indifference which inhibits the pair 
from any autonomous movement. Ros struggles to understand their present situation so 
that he may act. While Ros labors to parse their vague exchange with Hamlet, Guil 
merely repeats what has been said. Ros tries to get Guil to go with him after Hamlet but 
Guil reasons “Why? They’ve got us placed now – if we start moving around, we’ll all be 
chasing each other all night” (RG 41). As Ros observes, Guil’s refusal to act makes the 
two characters spectators.16 Guil no longer wants to struggle to understand, he is content 
to wait and see what happens next: “Wheels have been set in motion, and they have their 
                                                            
16 “I feel like a spectator – an appalling business” (RG 41). 
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own pace, to which we are… condemned. Each move is dictated by the previous one – 
that is the meaning of order. If we start being arbitrary it’ll just be a shambles: at least, let 
us hope so” (RG 60). Guil is unwilling to act because he is afraid to act. He does not 
know the initial conditions and he cannot predict what will come next. Rather than 
struggling to understand, Guil concedes to a higher determinism to propel his course. 
Unfortunately for Guil, his world is fraught with uncertainty and it is impossible to 
predict how action (and even inaction) will affect his circumstances. 
Ros and Guil are not the only characters in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern who 
cannot predict the chain of events that make up their world. Stoppard emphasizes the 
separate sphere of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern through the interactions between Ros, 
Guil and the Player. While all three are part of Hamlet, their roles in Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern are separate. Though the Player seems to have some notion of Hamlet’s 
trajectory, he is just as subject to uncertainty in Rosencrantz and Guildenstern as Ros and 
Guil:  
It was not until the murderer’s long soliloquy that we were able to look around; 
frozen as we were in profile, our eyes searched you out, first confidently, then 
hesitantly, then desperately as each patch of turf, each log, every exposed corner 
in every direction proved uninhabited (RG 64).  
The Player’s vulnerability is demonstrated by the surprise, hurt and confusion he feels as 
a result of Ros and Guil’s disappearance earlier in the play. Robbed of observers, the 
players are trapped between their roles as characters in the dumb show and characters of 
Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. Like a photon in an indeterminate state, the players 
depend on their observers to define their role and their identities. 
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 The Player makes Stoppard’s strongest argument for a quantum world view that 
embraces uncertainty rather than enforcing a Newtonian order which is incongruent to the 
natural state of things. The Player challenges Guil’s view of uncertainty and chaos as a 
glitch in the orderly predetermined system of nature: 
 Player: Uncertainty is in the normal state. You’re nobody special. 
 Guil: But for God’s sake what are we supposed to do?! 
 Player: Relax. Respond. That’s what people do. You can’t go through life 
questioning your situation at every turn. 
Guil: But we don’t know what’s going on, or what to do with ourselves. We don’t 
know how to act. 
Player: Act natural. You know why you’re here at least. 
Guil: We only know what we’re told, and that’s little enough. And for all we 
          know it isn’t even true. 
 Player: For all anyone knows, nothing is. Everything has to be taken on trust; 
truth is only that which is taken to be true. It’s the currency of living.   
There may be nothing behind it, but it doesn’t make any difference so long  
as it is honoured (RG 66-67). 
In this exchange the classical is pitted against the quantum. Guil has refused to act 
because he does not have all of the facts but the Player asserts that it is impossible to ever 
have all of the facts. This is in part because, as Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle 
proved, the world is not predictable. Uncertainty and order coincide to complete the 
disorderly order of our universe. It also refutes any acquisition of absolute knowledge or 
truth. As the Uncertainty Principle reified, the best that can be hoped for is an educated 
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conjecture and gone are the days of the clock-work universe which only needs to be taken 
apart. The Player at the same time emphasizes the importance of action. All one can do is 
react and trust that some of one’s assumptions are true; but there is never anyway to 
know for sure. As long as this is honored the uncertainty does nOt matter. Guil’s 
pragmatic and classical temperament creates a mental block which prevents him from 
opening his mind to uncertainty and all its possibilities. 
 When Ros shouts for Hamlet, Hamlet appears demonstrating that Ros and Guil 
are capable of effecting change if they choose to do so (RG 90). However, Ros is only 
able to convince Guil to act when Hamlet tells them to go on to the ship headed for 
England: 
 Ros: He said we can go. Cross my heart. 
 Guil: I like to know where I am. Even if I don’t know where I am, I like to know 
         that. If we go there’s no knowing. 
Ros: No knowing what? 
Guil: If we’ll ever come back. 
Ros: We don’t want to come back. 
Guil: That may very well be true, but do we want to go? 
Ros: We’ll be free (RG 95). 
Ros intuits that the only way to effect change is through action. As the Player explained, 
they must react and trust some assumptions to be true if they want to move through their 
uncertain world. Though Guil does act he does so begrudgingly and only on Ros and 
Hamlet’s behest. His action is not indicative of any acceptance of uncertainty; rather, he 
clings to the next determined environment he encounters (the boat) and so stubbornly 
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refuses to engage in his reality by acting that he seals the fate of all of the characters in 
both plays. 
 Although Guil finally accepts that he has some freedom to act, he limits his 
freedom to that which keeps him comfortably within the bounds of his determinate 
course. Guil relaxes considerably once on the boat headed to bring Prince Hamlet to 
England. He takes comfort in the contained nature of the boat: “Yes, I’m very fond of 
boats myself I like the way they’re – contained. You don’t have to worry about which 
way to go, or whether to go at all – the question doesn’t arise, because you’re on a boat, 
aren’t you” (RG 100). Guil enjoys the limited freedom the boat affords him because he 
doesn’t have to worry about straying outside of the pre-determined course that he 
believes exists:  
Free to move, speak, extemporize, and yet. We have not been cut loose. Our 
truancy is defined by one fixed star, and our drift represents merely a slight 
change of angle to it: we may seize the moments, toss it around while the 
moments pass, a short dash here, an exploration there, but we are brought round 
full circle to face again the single immutable fact – that we, Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern, bearing a letter from one king to another are taking Hamlet to 
England (RG 101). 
While Ros struggles to understand the chaos around him and act on his best assumptions, 
Guil easily embraces what his classical sentiments understand: an ordered and predictable 
path. 
 This inability to open his mind to uncertainty cripples Guil to the point that he 
loses all human empathy and seals his own fate when he chooses not to act and reseals 
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the letter. Both characters are challenged in the climactic scene in which they read the 
contents of the King’s letter and realize that their mission is to escort young Hamlet to his 
death. Ros reacts emotionally, “We’re his friends” (RG 110). Guil, resistant as always to 
action, argues that they have no way of knowing this and that they have only been told 
they are friends of Hamlet. Echoing the Player, Ros argues that what they are told is all 
they have to depend on. Guil attempts to reason his way out of action: 
… Well, he is a man, he is mortal, death comes to us all, etcetera, and 
consequently he would have died anyway, sooner or later. Or to look at it from 
the social point of view – he’s just one man among many, the loss would be well 
within reason and convenience… Or look at it another way – we are little men, we 
don’t know the ins and outs of the matter, there are wheels within wheels, etcetera 
– it would be presumptuous of us to interfere with the designs of fate or even of 
kings. All in all, I think we’d be well advised to leave well alone. Tie up the letter 
– there – neatly – like that. – They won’t notice the broken seal (RG 110). 
Guil would rather sacrifice the life of his presumed friend than step outside of his 
newfound determined course. Ros is unmoved by Guil’s cold, selfishly pragmatic 
rationalization. Ros is not willing to risk his friend’s life. He tries to persuade through 
emotion, “He’s done nothing to us” but to no avail. Ultimately Guil’s fear of action keeps 
him from reacting sympathetically to Hamlet’s danger. Though Ros ultimately does not 
oppose Guil’s decision, he does not endorse it: “It’s awful” (RG 111). Guil realizes his 
mistake too late. Only at the very end does Guil realize the folly of refusing to act: “There 
must have been a moment, at the beginning, where we could have said – no. But 
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somehow we missed it” (RG 125). Guil’s fear of uncertainty paralyzes him to the point 
that he allows himself to be propelled to his own death. 
 Guil is so desperate to ignore any indication that they have made a wrong choice 
because acknowledging that mistake would mean they would have to abandon the 
predetermined course laid before them and return to the realm of the indeterminate. Guil 
becomes increasingly panicked as he consistently fails to satisfactorily apply logic to 
their situation. The fact that he cannot successfully trace effects back to their causes is 
maddening to the ever pragmatic Guil. He is so desperate to understand the order of the 
system he’s in that Guil readily clings to the first opportunity for deterministic 
movement. Aboard the ship, Guil is finally at peace because he is no longer an 
autonomous agent in an indeterminate reality. He is confined within the ship and 
therefore is bound to the ship’s trajectory. But this false sense of security is what lulls 
Guil into making his last decision – a decision that seals the fate of both plays.  
 Chaos theory opens the door for change, but Guil’s desperate adherence to the 
Newtonian paradigm prevents him from seeing any way out. Only because in Guil’s mind 
the universe consists of “wheels within wheels” is he bound to the deterministic tug of 
the system. He cannot see that determinism is no longer the operating ideology; his world 
is dynamic and fraught with uncertainty – much like our own. It is Guil’s failure to 
perceive uncertainty as possibility –freedom to choose – that damns him, not 
Shakespeare. Stoppard dramatizes the folly in allowing uncertainty to paralyze you to the 
point of inaction.  
From the beginning of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern the audience is faced with 
the crux of the paradox of complementarity: entities can exist in opposite states 
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simultaneously. The audience is told that Ros and Guil are dead and yet there they are 
tossing coins. Audience members who are familiar with Hamlet will know that indeed 
“Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are dead” (Hamlet V.ii.353). And yet… there they are 
watching the dumb show, struggling to understand what is right in front of them. For the 
audience, Ros and Guil are simultaneously alive and dead; simultaneously characters in 
Shakespeare’s play and Stoppard’s. Although they may be doomed by Hamlet and by the 
title, their anxieties are real, their choices are real and their struggle to understand the 
indeterminate world they occupy is real. Rosencrantz and Guildenstern may be dead but 
Ros and Guil remain caught in a system in which their opportunities to create new exists 
are clouded by their staunch dedication to the classical mechanical theory of the world 
and their underestimation of the potential impact of the trivial. For Ros and Guil what is 
determinate are their roles in Hamlet. What takes place in the margins of Hamlet however 
becomes the indeterminate realm of Rosencrantz and Guildenstern. In this indeterminate 
realm even the most trivial decisions can have an incalculable impact. What Ros and Guil 
do not realize is that they did have a chance to change the course of their destiny, only it 
was such a fleeting and seemingly inconsequential moment; they allowed it to pass them 
by. 
The world does not work in the neat orderly manner Newton laid out, but we still 
must act within it as a part of it. Nature may be imbued with chaos and uncertainty but so 
are human beings. People do not fall neatly into ‘either/or’ categories rather they are a 
mass of contradictions, inconsistencies and complexities. The prediction of human 
behavior is as difficult as predicting whether light will present itself as particle or wave. 
The same complexities that quantum science seeks to explain in Nature also present 
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themselves in individuals. Our actions have incalculable potential and there is no 
predicting the ramifications of even the most trivial act. Stoppard suggests that rather 
than lamenting the loss of order (as Guil and Einstein do) we should rejoice in throwing 
off the oppressive shackles of the clock work universe. By recognizing the complexities 
inherent in ourselves, we can identify with the perspective presented by chaos theory, 
rather than fearing uncertainty. Without uncertainty there would be no opportunity for 
change or creation. As autonomous agents in this dynamic system we have the power to 
affect change through our choice of actions within that system. 
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CHAPTER III: LIGHT, IDENTITY, AND THE INESCAPABLE REALITY OF 
UNCERTAINTY 
 
Physics is not important, love is. 
Richard Feynman17 
 
Although Hapgood was not a critical success it effectively furthered Stoppard’s 
argument for the complexity of human personality. While in Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern Stoppard allowed select paradigms of quantum science to inform his play, 
in Hapgood he infuses the very structure of the play with Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
principle. By juxtaposing the indeterminacy and complementarity of light particles with 
the subtleties and complexities of identity, Stoppard creates a parallel between the two 
emphasizing their dependence on an observer and their fluid nature. The parallel 
demonstrates the reality of chaotic aspects in our own nature, thereby establishing human 
beings as fundamental agents in the universe who are just as unpredictable as their 
universe. Stoppard argues for a ‘both/and’ perspective in a world in which the ‘either/or’ 
paradigm is antithetical not only to the reality of the universe but also to the reality of 
human identity - both of which can be said to have infinite and contradictory possible 
manifestations that only become fixed when someone observes it from a specific point of 
view. 
                                                            
17 In a letter to Marcus Chown’s mother written at the behest of her son to convey the 
importance of physics. Richard Feynman is considered the “greatest theoretical physicist 
of his generation” (Gribbin 91). 
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The Double Slit Experiment demonstrates the ultimate ‘either/or’ question of 
quantum science: Is light either a wave or a particle? The answer of course is that light 
consists of both waves and particles. As discussed in the introduction, the double-slit 
experiment reveals the indeterminate nature of light as both particle and wave. The 
problem was there was no way to predict which it would present: particle or wave?  Any 
attempt to observe the photons passing through the slit only served to produce what the 
observer was looking for: particles or waves. The deeper scientists probed, the more 
unsatisfactory the ‘either/or’ paradigm became; nature simply did not function in this 
manner. Experiment after experiment proved not only was the clock work model 
obsolete, but so was the ‘either/or’ logic on which it depended. Quantum theory, 
however, provided an alternative: the possibility that entities in the universe could both 
be one thing and another. Like light being both particle and wave, quantum theory 
challenged the world to open its mind to the realization that in nature things are rarely 
‘either/or’. Increasingly the ‘both/and’ world view began to better reflect the realities of 
the world. 
 Stoppard constructs a plot, which not only allows him to explore the intricacies of 
quantum science and identity, but self-reflexively reinforces these concepts. The play 
begins with a failed experiment which leads the characters to develop a hypothesis 
(Ridley is the double agent). The hypothesis is tested in the second act of the play with 
another experiment (the trap for Ridley). The scientific structure works on two levels. 
First, the movement of characters in the experiment is reminiscent of the movement of 
particles in a double slit experiment. The men’s bath house in which the first scene is set 
has four doors by which characters can come and go. The scene opens with a whirlwind 
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of entrances and exits by a number of characters. The bathhouse which is described as 
circumnavigable makes it particularly difficult to determine which doors characters are 
going into or coming out of. The introduction of twins increases the difficulty to the point 
that it is nearly impossible to predict the movements of characters or even determine who 
they are.  Like in the double slit experiment it is impossible to tell which door (hole) the 
character (photon) will go through. With the introduction of twins it becomes impossible 
to tell which twin we are seeing.  
Each experiment reveals the complexity of identity and the importance of the 
observer. The experiments (like the double slit experiment) the indeterminacy and 
complementarity of identity. In the first scene, both the Russian twins and the Ridley 
twins cause chaos because the agents do not know which twin to follow. In the final 
experiment, Hapgood pretends to be her own twin Celia while Ridley continues to 
pretend not to be the spy he really is. There is the added complication in the inter-scene 
of the second act when Ridley suddenly makes a ‘quantum leap’ and becomes his twin.18 
 Through juxtaposition Stoppard explores the indeterminacy and complementarity 
of identity, and through the lens of quantum science constructs a plot which inherently 
demonstrates the wisdom of accepting a ‘both/and’ quantum world view and the folly of 
sticking to the ‘either/or’ Newtonian perspective. For most of the second scene the 
audience is faced with the mysterious complementarity of identity. Throughout the entire 
second experiment the audience must question what it is seeing: Hapgood or Celia? 
Ridley or Ridley’s twin? It was in response to the wave-particle duality that Niels Bohr 
                                                            
18 This mirrors the quantum phenomenon of an electron’s ability to change quantum 
states. Momentarily in a superposition of states, an electron “jumps” to a different energy 
level. 
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coined the term “complementarity.” Bohr considered “an entity such as an electron as 
neither a wave nor a particle but something different” (Gribbin 16). Rather than forcing 
the ‘either/or’ Bohr settles for a more realistic concept of light has both particle and wave 
depending on the observer.  
 Within this structure, Stoppard uses twins to convey the indeterminacy of identity 
by highlighting the fundamental unreliability of appearances. The twin motif is 
introduced almost immediately in the first act. As Hapgood and her team lie in wait for 
their Russian ‘sleeper’ turned ‘joe’ Kerner to meet his contact Georgi, they are 
unpleasantly surprised by the appearance of twin Russian agents.19 Merryweather, a 
member of Hapgood’s team assigned with the job of tailing the Russian contact, 
unwittingly follows one twin in and the other twin out; completely unaware that he is 
tailing two different people. These are not the last set of twins to appear in the play. 
When Ridley is discovered to be the double agent, Kerner and Hapgood correctly 
conclude (on the basis of the bridges of Königsberg) that Ridley has been passing 
information to the Russians with the help of his twin. In order to catch Ridley and his 
twin in the act, Hapgood must pretend to be her own twin, Celia Newton. Katherine Kelly 
argues that like the dual nature of light, “twins insidiously undermine all notions of fixity 
– fixed time, fixed space, personal identity, and reliable perception” (Kelly 151). In the 
world of espionage, twins make particularly adept agents because they defy surveillance. 
However, twins are not the only representations of doubles in the play. Almost every 
                                                            
19 John Fleming provides the following definitions: “[a] ‘sleeper’ is an agent who is sent 
in years in advance and establishes himself or herself as an ordinary citizen preparing for 
the moment when he or she will be activated and required to pass on vital pieces of 
information. A ‘joe’ is an agent who has been turned to work for the other side” (Fleming 
177). 
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character in Hapgood is a double in some way. The play suggests that this notion of 
“twinning” (that two possibilities can exist simultaneously) is a fundamental part of 
human nature.  
 By presenting characters that carry multiple identities (depending on the context 
in which they are viewed) Stoppard makes a strong case for the complementarity of 
identity. Complementarity is demonstrated in Hapgood by the numerous and varied 
monikers given to the characters. Kerner is one of Hapgood’s ‘joes’ but he is also Josef, 
her former lover whom she still affectionately refers to sometimes as Joe. He is the father 
of her son, who is also named Joe. Not only does Hapgood have many ‘Joes/joes’ (some 
of which are Joes on multiple levels) in her life, but she also goes by a number of 
different names. To the agents and ‘joes’ that she runs she is Hapgood or her code name 
‘Mother’.20 At work Hapgood is ‘Mother’, at home she is Mum. At times Hapgood also 
goes by ‘Mrs. Hapgood’ (the title of course being a courtesy as she is unmarried). 
Hapgood’s handles become more personal, depending on the level of intimacy with other 
characters. To Blair, who is both her boss and (it is suggested) her occasional lover, she is 
alternately Hapgood and Elizabeth. Kerner on the other hand refers to her affectionately 
by the Russian translation of her name: Yelizaveta or Lilichka and in the diminutive, 
Lilya. Once she assumes the role of her own twin sister, Celia Newton, Hapgood refers to 
herself (herself being Hapgood not Celia) as ‘Betty’ and is dubbed ‘Auntie’ by Ridley. 
Fleming argues that, “the lack of a single, fixed name alludes to the changing, divided 
nature of her individual identity and the motif of ambiguous nomenclature runs 
                                                            
20 Blair explains to Wates: “[t]here is a son but she was called Mother when she joined 
the Defence Liaison Committee – the tea would arrive and the Minister would say, 
‘Who’s going to be mother?” (Hapgood 27). 
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throughout the play, reinforcing the theme that everyone has multiple identities” 
(Fleming 184). The reality of multiple identities is one which Kerner readily embraces, 
Blair rejects, and Hapgood hopelessly tries to juggle. 
 Like Einstein and Bohr, Stoppard pits the classical ‘either/or’ Blair against 
quantum ‘both/and’ Kerner to highlight the inevitable fallibilities in ‘either/or’ thinking 
and to emphasize the two extremes Hapgood is caught between. The concept of multiple 
identities is first voiced by Kerner in the second scene of the first act as he obliquely 
answers Blair’s query as to where his loyalties lie: East or West. Kerner prefaces his 
answer with a description of the double slit experiment and the dual nature of light. When 
Blair fails to grasp the significance of this Kerner answers more directly:  
Somehow light is particle and wave. The experimenter makes the choice. You get 
what you interrogate for. And you want to know if I’m a wave or a particle. I 
meet my Russian friend Georgi, and we exchange material. When the experiment 
is over, you have a result: because I have given Georgi enough information to 
keep him credible as a KGB control who is running me as a sleeper – which is 
what he thinks he is. (Hapgood 12). 
Kerner’s easy acceptance of the duality of both light and identity is not only because of 
the fact that he is a physicist but also that as an individual, Kerner must balance a number 
of roles and identities.21 Because of his own bifurcated identity, Kerner has ceased to 
                                                            
21 In Theatre of Chaos: Beyond Absurdism, into Orderly Disorder, William Demastes 
charts Kerner’s many roles: “[h]e is both physicist and secret agent, by birth German and 
Russian (having been born in the German city of Königsberg (which was annexed as 
Russian after World War II and renamed Kaliningrad), by current affiliation both Russian 
and British (working for both governments), by inclination an artist though by training a 
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operate within the restrictive Newtonian ‘either/or’ mindset and has adopted the 
‘both/and’ quantum world view. If Kerner is the character in the play who most embraces 
the implications of wave-particle duality, Blair is the most resistant. In Hapgood, Blair 
represents the staunchly Newtonian mindset, still mired in binaries and hopelessly 
trapped in an ‘either/or’ world. 
 Because Blair fails to grasp the fluidity of identity, he imposes strict ‘either/or’ 
boundaries on his and Hapgood’s relationship. By denying the inherent complexity of life 
and identity, Blair ruins their relationship and dramatizes the folly of ‘either/or’ thinking. 
Blair is woefully out of step with the new sciences as Stoppard makes clear in the third 
scene of the first act: “[a]nti-particles. Do you know what they are? They were never 
mentioned by Democritus who was the pro-particle chap when I was at school” 
(Hapgood 18). Blair goes on to admit, “I gave a chap a job with us once because he said 
he’d read physics and I thought he meant the book by Aristotle” (Arcadia 18). Both of 
these ancient philosophers were determinists who rejected chance and chaos and strove 
for a more ordered understanding of the world. With this ideological background it is not 
surprising that Blair fails to grasp Kerner’s meaning.22 Blair’s mindset is militantly 
‘either/or’: either with us or against us; either Russian or British; either technical or 
personal he maintains distinct boundaries. The only area in Blair’s life which becomes 
blurred is his relationship with Hapgood.  
                                                                                                                                                                                 
scientist, fluent in both Russian and English, lover and employee of Hapgood (the father 
of her son)” (Chaos 44). 
 
22 Demastes argues: “the thing that quantum mechanics challenges – the notion of an 
objective, rationalist grounding of reality – is the thing the chief British officer, Blair, 
needs so desperately to understand in order to recover stolen, nationally sensitive 
property. It is, however, the thing Blair refuses to grasp” (Chaos 44). 
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The tenuous relationship that exists between Hapgood and Blair is clearly divided 
into two definite spheres: personal or technical. The boundaries of their relationship are 
established in the second scene of the first act:  
 Blair: Don’t pack it in yet, I need you. 
 Hapgood: I suppose that’s technical, is it? 
 Blair: I suppose so. 
 Hapgood: Just making sure. I was calling you at the pool this morning. Where 
were you? 
 Blair: I was there. 
 Hapgood: I needed you. 
 Blair: No, no, that was only personal. But you’re going to need me now (Hapgood 
24). 
Hapgood’s sarcastic quip “I suppose that’s technical, is it?” suggests that this is not the 
first time the two have had a conversation on this issue. The scene also establishes Blair’s 
priorities. Blair will always choose the technical over the personal. In his mind they both 
need each other technically, but she is not allowed to need him personally if it conflicts 
with the technical. The ultimate demonstration of Blair’s true loyalty occurs at the end of 
the play. After agreeing with Hapgood that it would be too dangerous to include her son 
in the trap for Ridley, Blair goes against her wishes and without her knowledge brings 
Joe to the pool.23 For Blair what matters is not the safety of a little boy, but the safety of 
                                                            
23 Fleming makes the assertion that “Blair surrenders his personal relationship with 
Hapgood and risks her son’s safety because for him individual people are sometimes 
pawns that must be sacrificed to win the “larger” game of international espionage” 
(Fleming 187). 
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the ‘Service’ and all its secrets. When faced with either the life of a child or getting the 
upper hand on the KGB, Blair chooses the latter. 
 Blair’s decision is antithetical to the decision Kerner has made before the play 
starts: to give the Russians his anti-particle research in exchange for his son’s safety. In 
the first scene of the second act, Kerner confesses that over a year ago the Russians found 
out about his and Hapgood’s son Joe and threatened his life if Kerner did not hand over 
his research. Although this story is supposed to be part of the ruse meant to lure Ridley 
into revealing his twin, both Hapgood and Blair realize that Kerner has ‘made up the 
truth’ (Hapgood 88). When Blair confronts him later Kerner coolly replies,  
Yes – no, either – or… You have been too long in the spy business, you think 
everybody has no secret or one big secret, they are what they seem or they are the 
opposite. You look at me and think: Which is he? Plus or minus? If only you 
could figure it out like looking into me to find my root. And then you still 
wouldn’t know. We’re all doubles. Even you (Hapgood 72). 
Although Blair sees him as a traitor for giving confidential information to the Russians, 
Kerner does not see himself as a traitor. He does not view himself as either a Russian 
sleeper or a British joe, rather he understands that he is both a spy and a father. In 
Kerner’s mind the East and the West are both relatively corrupt and what deserves his 
protection and loyalty are not either of these but his eleven year old son.24 
Blair refuses to recognize the fluidity of identity. When Blair finally tires of 
Kerner’s quantum metaphors he explodes “You’re this or you’re that, and you know 
                                                            
24 Delaney argues this scene demonstrates that “Kerner seems to think not so much in 
terms of ideology as in terms of the responsibility he bears as an individual in dealing 
with other individuals” (Delaney 139).  
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which. Physics is a detail I can’t afford, I’ve got one of my people working the inside 
lane on false papers and if she’s been set up I’ll feed you to the crocodiles – is that real 
enough for you?” (Hapgood 73). Kerner’s response foreshadows Blair’s decision at the 
end of the play: “One of your people? Oh, Paul. You would betray her before I would. My 
mamushka” (Hapgood 73).25 When they are in the technical realm Blair expects to deal 
with Hapgood. When they are in the personal realm Paul expects Elizabeth. Blair does 
not tolerate either world interfering with the other. He doesn’t grasp that Hapgood and 
Elizabeth are two sides of the same person and sometimes the technical becomes 
personal. When Hapgood calls out to Blair at the end of the first act, she is not calling as 
an employee reporting to her boss, she is calling as an upset lover and she receives no 
answer. Although Hapgood has already experienced her personal world interfere with her 
technical world, Blair is unwilling to cave on his boundaries. When she radios, Blair 
expects to hear Hapgood reporting in but it is Elizabeth calling out. He ignores her call, 
choosing the technical over the personal for the first but not last time in the play.Blair 
refuses to accept the uncertainty of reality. However, the world is not static and neither 
are the individuals that populate it. By denying the complementarity of identity Blair not 
only fails to see the answer to his case but also drives Hapgood away. 
                                                            
25 Delaney posits: “although Blair may perceive Kerner’s statement as evidence of 
continuing loyalty to the West, Kerner is actually saying that he places a higher premium 
on not betraying a particular person - much as he would protect his own mother – than on 
giving away scientific secrets” (Delaney 138). Delaney uses this as a basis to ultimately 
pit the two against each other: “[a]s opposed to Kerner’s poignant concern for persons, 
the urbane organization man Blair is the prim exemplar in the play of the elevation of 
corporate interests above any interest in individuals… Blair sees persons ultimately in 
terms of their instrumental worth, as tools, chess pieces, to be used” (Delaney 140). 
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 The play juxtaposes the ideologically opposed Blair and Kerner, setting the stage 
for the crux of the play: Hapgood’s decision about her own identity – between her role as 
‘Mother’ and Mum. Hapgood’s conversion from an ‘either/or’ to a ‘both/and’ perspective 
begins with the birth of her son – an experience which teaches her the inevitable 
superposition of states in life. Hapgood is not only calculatingly brilliant, she is an 
excellent manager and spy and the first and only woman in the Service. However, since 
the birth of her son Hapgood feels increasingly torn between her professional or technical 
world (her job) and her personal one (her son and the men she loves). She slowly allows 
her personal world to encroach upon her technical. When Blair admonishes Hapgood for 
sending Joe a postcard while on a covert operation, she hotly responds:    
No, you’re right, I break the rules, and if Matron is KGB it’s going to be all over 
Dzerzhinsky Square – Hapgood was in Vienna. Well, I keep missing things, last 
time I missed him in Robin Hood even if he was only a tree, and if I can’t send 
him a rotten postcard  you can take Vienna and stick it up your –  (Hapgood 22).  
Hapgood cannot suppress the guilt she feels for putting her son in boarding school but 
realizes that her job is incompatible with the demands of a full-time parent:  
He’d have to put himself to bed four times a week even when I’m working out of 
Half Moon Street – I already run the only intelligence network in the Western 
world which exhibits seasonal fluctuations, and it’s only a matter of time before 
somebody works out it’s the school holidays. Anyway, there’s the male society 
thing, they’re supposed to need that when they haven’t got a father (Hapgood 23). 
Hapgood’s guilt is not merely because she feels that she is an absent mother, but also 
because she feels she has robbed her son of his father, all in the name of business. 
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 Hapgood’s relationship with Kerner is a constant tug of war between her personal 
and professional sensibilities. On one hand, Joseph Kerner is the Russian sleeper she 
turned: her ‘star joe’. She is ferociously proud of this: “Kerner is my joe! I turned him” 
(Hapgood 43). On the other, he is her Joe – lover and father to their son. As Ridley 
explains to Celia (who is actually Hapgood):  
She got pregnant screwing the Russians, Auntie. Then it was a choice between 
losing a daddy and losing a prize double, a turned mole who would have been 
blown overnight if he was known to be the father, and we aren’t in the daddy 
business, we’re in the mole business (Hapgood 81).  
Once Kerner is blown and there are no professional limitations to their relationship, 
Hapgood clumsily tries to reinitiate the personal relationship that she has rejected all 
along: “I won’t need you any more, I mean I’ll need you again – oh, sugar! – you know 
what I mean – do you want to marry me? I think I’d like to be married” (Hapgood 50). 
Hapgood struggles to recover what she has lost (her family) in the name of business. 
However, just as Hapgood is realizing the depth of her feeling, Kerner is more 
convinced than ever that their relationship was never more than business for her. He 
reproachfully reminds her:  
If I loved you it was so long ago I had to tell you in Russian and you kept the tape 
running. It was not a safe house for love. The spy was falling in love with the 
case-officer, you could hear it on the playback. One day you switched off the 
hidden microphone and got pregnant (Hapgood 50).  
He responds incredulously to her protestations of love: “You interrogated me. Weeks, 
months, every day. I was your thought, your objective… If love was like that it would not 
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even be healthy” (Hapgood 50). His constant and cynical denial brings forth the true 
force of Hapgood’s love: “(Flares) That’s a damned lie! You unspeakable cad!” 
(Hapgood 50). The normally prim Hapgood, the unflappable spy mistress is finally 
pushed to profanity. However, the tenderness between the two is truly felt after Kerner 
reveals his plans to return home: 
 Hapgood: You mustn’t say that to me, Joseph. Please don’t say it. 
 (Kerner comforts her.) 
 Kerner: Milaya moya, rodnaya moya26… it’s all right. I am your Joe. 
 (She suffers his embrace, then softens into it.) (Hapgood 51). 
Despite what has transpired between them there is a gentleness to their exchanges that 
suggests their relationship was more than Kerner claims it was and more than Hapgood 
believed it to be. 
 Until the final scene of the play, Hapgood has consistently chosen the technical 
over the personal. Once she assumes her role as her own twin Celia Newton, Hapgood is 
allowed to step outside of herself and not only take an objective look but fully become 
her antithesis. Ridley (for whom the ruse is intended) describes Celia as “a pot-head… 
she won’t stop talking, she bites her nails, she looks like shit” (Hapgood 66).  As her own 
sister, Hapgood allows herself surprisingly honest self-reflection: “having the kid was 
good for her, she always thought the delinquents had the bastards and the scholarship 
girls had the wedding. It shook up her view of the world” (Hapgood 77). As the 
conversation revolves around Joe, Ridley becomes increasingly bitter, “she should have 
given him a daddy instead of getting her buzz out of running joes to please an old bastard 
                                                            
26 My darling, my darling… 
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who doesn’t want her and never will… Blair’s been running her for years!” (Hapgood  
81). In a line that cuts right to the heart of the matter Ridley sardonically remarks: “Betty 
bought the whole lie and put it first, she is the lie” (Hapgood 82). Hapgood has dedicated 
her life and sacrificed her family for her work, but once her technical world begins to 
threaten her personal one, Hapgood draws the line. 
 Blair’s betrayal ultimately allows Hapgood to make the ideological break 
necessary to leave her technical world and fully assume her role in her personal one.27 
Not only does Blair betray her trust by bringing her son into a potentially dangerous 
situation against her express wishes, but he does so knowing full well what her reaction 
will be: 
 Hapgood: I’ll never forgive you for that, never ever. 
Blair: I know that. I knew that. (Hapgood 86). 
Despite the fact that Blair knew his actions would be detrimental to his personal 
relationship with Hapgood, he refused to allow it to affect his technical decisions. What 
he did not anticipate was that once Hapgood’s technical world endangered the very center 
of her personal one, she would choose being Mum over “Mother”.28 Trying to bring her 
back to ‘reality’ Blair poses the ultimate ‘either/or’ question: 
Blair: It’s them or us, isn’t it? 
                                                            
27 Fleming observes, “for ten years Hapgood chose the values of the technical over the 
values of the personal, but now, after killing Ridley and seeing Blair, the man she most 
wanted, place her son’s life in jeopardy, she disavows her profession” (Fleming 189). 
 
28 Kelly reasons: “the process of confirming Ridley’s double (and double cross) also 
confirmed Blair’s Newtonian rigidity and Hapgood’s post-Newtonian flexibility” (Kelly 
157). 
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Hapgood: Who? Us and the KGB? The opposition! We’re just keeping each other 
in business, we should send each other Christmas cards – oh, f-f-fuck it, Paul! 
(Hapgood 87). 
The two Hapgoods collapse as the mother reacts to Blair’s careless use of her child and 
‘Mother’ realizes that the game she thought she was playing isn’t real at all.  
 In summary, through quantum physics Stoppard argues for the complexity and 
unpredictability of individual personality and in doing so he emphasizes the importance 
of human choice and action. Kerner in particular argues for the uniqueness of human 
personality. The fact that complex and diverse personalities (like Einstein’s) occur is 
proof to him that God exists. For Kerner the very existence of such complex and fluid 
personalities proves there is some meaning in the chaos. In Arcadia, Bernard makes a 
similar argument when he angrily tells Valentine “you cannot put Byron in a laptop” 
(Arcadia 60). Invention depends on chaos and unpredictability, and is ultimately shaded 
by the complexities of the creator’s personality. Hannah also argues that this element of 
unpredictability is necessary for genius. Valentine dismisses the fact that Thomasina and 
Septimus could have discovered what their scribbling indicates “[b]ecause there’s an 
order things can’t happen in. You can’t open a door till there’s a house.” Hannah 
meaningfully responds, “I thought that’s what genius was” (Arcadia 79). Although 
Thomasina’s brilliant equation depends on the computer in order to be fully realized, it is 
still imbued by the complexities of her personality. Though the equation is logically 
brilliant she gives it the witty (but silly) name: the “rabbit equation” because it “eats its 
own progeny”. The complexities of human personalities and the actions they choose 
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imbue the world with both chaos and order demonstrating the fundamental importance of 
human action in the universe. 
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CHAPTER IV: ORDER OUT OF DISORDER INTO DISORDER: THE 
REGENERATIVE WALTZ 
 
Nature has played a joke on the mathematicians. The nineteenth century mathematicians 
may have been lacking in imagination, but Nature was not. 
F.J. Dyson, ‘Characterizing Irregularity’29 
 
Arcadia shares many characteristics with the previous plays discussed here. All 
three contain mysteries which require detective style inquiry: in Rosencrantz and 
Guildenstern the hapless duo try to determine why they are where they are and how they 
should act; in Hapgood the titular character must determine how Ridley has been slipping 
information to the Russians and whether or not Kerner has also become a double agent; 
and in Arcadia Bernard seeks to discover what occurred when Byron was at Sidley Park 
and Hannah searches for the Sidley Hermit. Superimposed on this modern timeline is the 
timeline in question: 1809 - Thomasina Coverly has just begun to explore the mysteries 
of her new mathematics.30 Stoppard uses both lines of inquiry (of the ability to accurately 
reconstruct the past, and the move from Newtonian science to fractal geometry) to 
display the fundamental connection between human action and the chaotic inclination of 
the universe. By establishing a plot structure that employs recursive symmetry Stoppard 
                                                            
29 (Nadel 433) 
 
30 Thomasina’s mathematics seeks to describe the irregular forms of the universe, like an 
apple leaf or a jagged coastline. Though she is limited by her lack of technology, 
Valentine later proves that her early attempts were correct. Through fractal geometry, 
Thomasina seeks to give order to the irregular patterns that appear in nature. 
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creates a predetermined world which unfolds along with the undetermined actions of the 
characters. Characters become agents of chaos and order in a world that becomes harder 
and harder to predict with the more human interaction. Through strange attractors and 
recursive symmetry Stoppard foregrounds the fundamental importance of human action 
and choice in a universe which blends order and disorder and is constantly regenerating 
itself. Stoppard structures his plot as a recursive system, constantly emphasizing the 
power of sex, love and human action in a world that blends the determined and the 
undetermined. What Stoppard achieves in Arcadia is not merely sentimentally powerful 
or scientifically adroit – it is a melding of both modern science and universal humanism 
which demonstrates that we are not merely affected by the chaotic inclinations of nature; 
rather we are a fundamental part of it.  
The structure of the play superimposes two timelines on the same scene. Although 
the characters change as time shifts, the physical reality of the room does not.  By using 
recurrent images (or strange attractors) like the apple, the garden and the letters, Stoppard 
demonstrates the level of determinism that is inevitable in the universe. Chaos occurs 
when human actions (especially those driven by sex or love) disrupt the natural order. 
Human desire becomes the external input in the complex system which no one can 
predict with certainty.31 In Arcadia the characters become unpredictable autonomous 
agents in the universe whose actions (no matter how trivial) have incalculable effects on 
the universe. However, no matter how much chaos is created by human action, order is 
                                                            
31 Hayles differentiates that “[w]hereas Newtonian mechanics envisions the universe 
through inertial reference frames that extend infinitely far in space and time, chaotic 
concentrates on complex irregular forms and conceptualizes them (in fractal geometry) 
through fractional dimensions that defeat tidy predictions and exact symmetries” (Hayles 
7). 
 
 
71
inevitable. Thomasina finally gets a hint of justification for her intuition at the end of the 
play in an article Septimus gives to her: “Well! Just as I said! Newton’s machine which 
would knock our atoms from cradle to grave by the laws of motion is incomplete! 
Determinism leaves the road at every corner, as I knew all along, and the cause is very 
likely hidden in this gentleman’s observation” (Arcadia 83-84). Through his work 
Stoppard has argued the humans are not mindless subjects battered around by the 
universe rather they are a fundamental agents of chaos and order in the universe. Through 
their free will to choose and act, human beings unleash energy into the universe which 
gets mixed in with incalculable results. All one can do in such a universe is strive to find 
truth where it is possible and to take responsibility for the potential chaos of one’s 
actions. 
Stoppard incorporates the conflict between Classicism and Romanticism, 
mirroring the conflict between the ordered Newtonian physics and the disordered chaos 
theory. The Romantic period signaled the end of the logical, ordered Classicism. The 
narrow parameters on art, society and literature were removed and the response was an 
effusion of beauty with an emphasis on “natural” and an avoidance of the artificial.32 The 
garden is the physical manifestation of this conflict between Classicism and 
Romanticism. Lady Coverly’s orderly garden is usurped by Mr. Noakes’s Romantic 
landscape design. The garden comes to embody the principles of chaos theory: though it 
                                                            
32 In “Keats and Romantic Science,” Alan Richardson explains: “With the mechanistic 
scientific paradigm associated with Newton giving way to a biological emphasis typified 
by Darwin, science and medicine took on a “Romantic” character, featuring a naturalistic 
ethos, an attention to “organic form,” and developmental and ecological models that 
show more than superficial resemblance to analogous impulses in the arts” (Richardson 
231). 
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is seemingly disordered, Mr. Noakes careful planning ensures that within the perceived 
disorder of a garden, there is an underlying order.33 Through the common pursuit of 
intellectual curiosity Stoppard bridges the gap between these two disparate periods. 
Because Arcadia’s plot structure represents a system which displays recursive 
symmetry there are a number of symmetries and asymmetries which occur throughout the 
play. In each scene the general form (the set) is repeated. The stage directions specify the 
uniformity of the set despite time period:  
The action of the play shuttles back and forth between the early nineteenth 
century and the present day, always in this same room. Both periods must share 
the state of the room, without the additions and subtractions which would 
normally be expected (Arcadia 15).  
Although the objects remain in the fixed location of the room, the actions of the 
characters are unpredictable and as a result the movement of the objects becomes 
unpredictable. Septimus’s pet tortoise Plautus is almost indistinguishable from 
Valentine’s Lightning. Fermat’s theorem (which Thomasina declares merely a joke to 
drive everyone mad) is reflected at the end of the play by Thomasina’s own theorem 
(which Septimus predicts will drive him mad). However, not all symmetries are sustained 
across the two periods. The uncertainty of human behavior causes asymmetries which 
cannot be predicted. Septimus and Thomasina share their first kiss in the hermitage; 
Bernard and Chlöe are caught having sex in the hermitage by Chlöe’s mother who is 
                                                            
33 Richardson argues: “The chemistry of the Romantic era – virtually a “new science”… 
implied a constantly changing physical environment, a world of process and 
transformation in contrast to the fixed and mechanical universe of Newtonian physics” 
(238). 
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looking for the theoldite (left by Hannah). Trivial acts bear incalculable effects in a 
chaotic system. The more erratic the variable, the harder to predict its movements. Not 
surprisingly, the fickle nature of sexual desire comes to have the biggest impact of all. 
 The apple, acting as a strange attractor, holds a dual meaning in the play; it is not 
only a symbol of science and scientific progress (it is what inspires Thomasina and what 
drives Hannah and Valentine to test her mad scribbling) but also becomes a symbol for 
love and sexual desire. The apple, whose leaf becomes a central image in the play, is 
introduced at the end of the first scene and is a point to which the play recurrently turns. 
The apple, a timeless symbol of temptation from the Garden of Eden and the central 
image in the apocryphal story of Newton’s discovery of gravity, is first given to Hannah 
by a besotted Gus in the second scene. His gesture seems to confirm what Clöe has been 
telling Hannah: Gus is in love with her. Disturbed by this display of affection, Hannah 
places the apple on the desk. Septimus picks up the apple in the third scene and (after 
cutting off the leaves and stems) proceeds to eat the apple, sharing occasionally with 
Plautus. Moments later Thomasina picks up the discarded apple leaf and vows to deduce 
its equation. Hannah will later pick up the same leaf as she timidly pushes Valentine, “So 
you couldn’t make a picture of this leaf by iterating a whatsit?” (Arcadia 47). Although 
Valentine denies such a possibility at first, by pushing Thomasina’s equation through a 
computer a few million times, he discovers that she was in fact on the right track and 
dubs the apple leaf algorithm: the Coverly set.  
It is because of her general unease towards love and sexual desire that Hannah 
originally abandons the apple on the desk. Indeed, in Arcadia the chaos sexual attraction 
inspires is what drives the action of the play. Valentine refers to sex as “[t]he attraction 
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that Newton left out” (Arcadia 74). As the characters act and make choices based on 
sexual desire, new relationships are created and destroyed. The order and disorder created 
by sexual desire unfolds together, creating the fabric of the human experience. The 
effects of actions driven by sexual desire are unpredictable and their effects reverberate 
from one time period to the next.  
Sex is a constant source of disorder and conflict in the play, demonstrating the 
unpredictability and potential chaos it is capable of creating34. Sex is introduced in the 
first line of the play with Thomasina’s question, “Septimus, what is carnal embrace?” 
(Arcadia 1). From that moment on, sex becomes one of the foreground issues in the play. 
The establishment and dissolution of relationships drives the plot creating order and 
chaos as sexual desire (the driving force) follows its own erratic course. The first scene 
opens with the revelation of Septimus and Mrs. Chater’s tryst35 in the gazebo. The tryst 
results in chaos with Chater’s discovery and threats of violence. Much of the first scene 
consists of a confused conversation between Septimus, Chater, Mr. Noakes, Captain 
Brice and Lady Croom. Lady Croom, Captain Brice and Mr. Noakes having unwittingly 
walked in on Septimus and Chater’s confrontation begin discussing the garden. Septimus 
and Chater consumed by their own predicament assume the other three are referring to 
                                                            
34 As Vees-Gulani argues “sex is in fact responsible for many different (unexpected) 
developments in the plot. It thus functions as a strange attractor to which the plot returns 
again and again, resembling a self-similar fractal structure” (Vees-Gulani 417). 
 
35 This affair sets up the conditions necessary to create the false history that Bernard 
“discovers”. It is because of his affair with Mrs. Chater that Septimus is challenged to a 
duel by Mr. Chater (in a note that Bernard later finds and assumes is Lord Byron’s) and is 
forced to mollify Mr. Chater with false praise and the promise of a glowing review of 
Couch of Eros. Sycophantically, Mr. Chater writes a warm inscription in Septimus’s copy 
of Couch of Eros (which Bernard later misinterprets). 
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Septimus’s tryst. The results are comical but nonetheless alarming to Septimus and 
puzzling to Lady Croom. It is Thomasina who perceives the folly of both and restores 
order: “Septimus, they are not speaking of carnal embrace, are you Mama?” (Arcadia 
10). 
 The first scene sparks Thomasina’s sexual awakening which will continue 
throughout the play and in turn creates more chaos which continues to drive the plot. 
While constantly on the fringe, Thomasina is all the more observant giving voice to what 
others do not or choose not to see. “Mama is in love with Lord Byron” Thomasina 
offhandedly remarks (Arcadia 36). Although it is true that Lady Croom and Lord Byron 
are having an affair, Thomasina does not state it just for the sake of conversation. She 
does so (childishly) to needle Steptimus, who is obviously affected by the news, 
“Septimus’s pen stops moving, he raises his eyes to her at last” (Arcadia 36). Thomasina 
also reveals that Byron (in an attempt to impress Lady Croom) let slip that Septimus was 
the author of a searing review of ‘The Maid of Turkey’ in front of Chater. This final 
insult drives Charter (with Captain Brice’s encouragement36) to challenge Septimus to a 
duel. In the midst of this confusion Lady Croom ducks in to “borrow” Septimus’s copy of 
‘The Couch of Eros’ for her lover Byron. 
Sex is a driving force, but it is not the defect of some omnipotent deity; rather, it 
is the culmination of human action and choice both of which can have incalculable 
affects on the universe. Septimus is saved from the duel when Lady Croom discovers 
                                                            
36 It is Captain Brice who has brought the Chaters to Sidley Park and it is suggested that 
he has done so more for Mrs. Chater’s talents than for Mr. Chater’s.  His encouragement 
for Chater to engage in a duel with Septimus is really driven from his own jealousy at 
having his mistress taken from him.  Comically, Chater is the only one (except for 
perhaps Thomasina) who does not realize this. 
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Mrs. Chater leaving Lord Byron’s room in the middle of the night. Lady Croom 
immediately dismisses the Chaters, Captain Brice (for bringing them there), and Lord 
Byron. She is furious with Septimus for having invited Byron. He mollifies his mistress 
by burning Byron’s letter, and scene six ends with the suggested promise of a late night 
rendezvous between Septimus and Lady Croom. By the next scene however, there has 
been a three year time lapse and Lady Croom has moved on, and is entertaining her new 
lover Count Zelinsky in the next room. Septimus sulks as Thomasina (three years older 
than in the last scene) vainly tries to flirt with her tutor. It is her desire for Septimus that 
causes Thomasina to sneak down on the night before her birthday to steal a waltz and a 
kiss. In Arcadia relationships are ruled by sexual desire which is unpredictable and 
erratic. Lady Croom transfers blame, rationalizing: “[i]t is a defect of God’s humor that 
he directs our hearts everywhere but to those who have a right to them” (Stoppard 71). 
However, as the play demonstrates, this classical deterministic view is naïve to the reality 
of the universe.  
Thomasina asserts both the power of sex and the power of choice in her 
discussion of Cleopatra. In her disdainful evaluation, Thomasina emphasizes not only the 
sexual aspect of Cleopatra’s choices but the historical impact of these choices: 
Everything is turned to love with her. New love, absent love, lost love – I 
never knew a heroine that makes such noodles of our sex. It only needs a 
Roman general to drop anchor outside the window and away goes the empire 
like a christening mug into a pawn shop. If Queen Elizabeth had been a 
Ptolmey history would have been quite different – we would be admiring the 
pyramids of Rome and the great Sphinx of Verona (Arcadia 38). 
 
 
77
Thomasina argues that history would have been better off if the lusty Cleopatra had been 
replaced by the “virgin” Queen. By juxtaposing two historically divergent sexual figures, 
Thomasina identifies sex as an uncontrollable and unpredictable historical agent apt to 
wreak chaos and destroy progress. 
 It is Chlöe who fully articulates the power of human action and sexual desire, and 
their potential impact in the universe. The conversation between Chlöe and Valentine 
about the possibility of a holistic prediction of future events reflects Thomasina and 
Septimus’s earlier conversation. 37 The difference is that Chlöe rejects hope of any 
definite knowledge of the universe reasoning that sex makes prediction impossible. 
 Chlöe: The future is all programmed like a computer – that’s a proper theory, isn’t 
it? 
 Valentine: The deterministic universe, yes. 
 Chlöe: Because everything including us is just a lot of atoms bouncing off each 
other like billiard balls. 
 Valentine: Yes. There was someone…38 
 Chlöe: But it doesn’t work, does it? 
 Valentine: No. It turns out the maths is different 
 Chlöe: No, it’s all because of sex. 
                                                            
37Thomasina: “If you could stop every atom in its position and direction, and if your mind 
could comprehend all the actions thus suspended, then if you were really, really good at 
algebra you could write the formula for all the future; and although nobody can be so 
clever as to do it, the formula must exist just as if one could.” 
Septimus: “(Pause) Yes. (Pause.) Yes, as far as I know, you are the first person to have 
thought of this” (Arcadia 5-6). 
 
38 Valentine was most likely about to reference Pierre Simon de Laplace. 
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 Valentine: Really? 
 Chlöe: That’s what I think. The universe is deterministic all right, just like 
Newton said, I mean it’s trying to be, but the only thing going wrong is 
people fancying people who aren’t supposed to be in that part of the plan. 
Valentine: Ah. The attraction that Newton left out. All the way back in the 
garden. Yes. (Pause) Yes, I think you’re the first person to think of this 
(Arcadia 74). 
Chlöe sees the universe in the same determined way Newton did, however Chlöe 
does not link human behavior to this same determined system. On the contrary, human 
behavior becomes an agent of chaos in a determined world. Once again “the 
unpredictable and predetermined unfold together to make everything the way it is” 
(Arcadia 47). Human behavior is unpredictable and erratic and becomes increasingly 
unpredictable when influenced by sexual desire. The importance of Chlöe’s argument lies 
in the power and autonomy she gives to human action. People are not helplessly bound to 
a determined system which drags them mercilessly to their death; rather they are free 
agents capable of creating both order and disorder.  
Even human affairs become recursive as the relationships of the modern period 
reflect those of their nineteenth century counterparts. Like Lord Byron and Lady Croom, 
Bernard and the current Lady Croom are engaged in a flirtatious, possibly intimate 
relationship. Valentine tells Hannah:  
My mother’s lent him her bicycle. Lending one’s bicycle is a form of safe sex, 
possibly the safest there is. My mother is in a flutter about Bernard, and he’s no 
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fool. He gave her a first edition Horace Walpole, and now she’s lent him her 
bicycle (Arcadia 51).  
Bernard’s potential affair is jeopardized by his current affair with her daughter Chlöe. 
While Septimus seems to be conscientious of Thomasina’s feelings, Bernard is oblivious, 
merely exhilarated by the game: “[n]o-I don’t want her mother to know. This is my first 
experience of the landed aristocracy. I tell you, I’m boggle-eyed” (Arcadia 64). Like 
Lady Croom, Bernard refuses to take responsibility for his actions, “[s]educed her? Every 
time I turned round she was up a library ladder. In the end I gave in” (Arcadia 64). 
Bernard is eventually burned when Chlöe’s mother catches her with Bernard in the 
hermitage. This is not however Bernard’s most significant relationship in the play. The 
relationship between Bernard and Hannah, though never physically sexual, is significant 
because it pits the classical and romantic ideologies that shape the play against one 
another.  
As the dominant form of communication in the play and a strange attractor, letters 
become a source of order and disorder as they both aid and sabotage the endeavors of 
those trying to reconstruct the past. The opening action of the first scene mirrors that of 
the third scene with Septimus, Thomasina and Jellaby on stage. The stage directions even 
comment, “We have seen this composition before: Thomasina at her place at the table; 
Septimus reading a letter which has just arrived; Jellaby waiting, having just delivered the 
letter” (Arcadia 35). The opening action of both of these scenes hangs on the contents of 
the letters. The letters of course are from the poet Ezra Chater, the first on the occasion of 
Septimus’s adultery with Mrs. Chater and the second in outrage at the degrading review 
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of Chater penned by Septimus. Septimus places both of these letters in his copy of The 
Couch of Eros (Chater’s latest book) along with a warning letter from Mrs. Chater (that 
her husband has sent for pistols). It is this copy of The Couch of Eros and its contents on 
which Bernard, after discovering on the sales slip it had been in Byron’s library, bases his 
investigation of Byron’s time at Sidley Park. On the basis of the letters, Bernard 
extrapolates that Byron had an affair with Mrs. Chater and then killed the small time poet 
Ezra Chater in a duel. Bernard believes this is the long searched for explanation as to why 
Byron sailed to Lisbon and stayed abroad for two years after 1809. On the basis of the 
passages underlined in The Couch of Eros, Bernard also infers that Byron was the 
slanderous author of the Chater review in the Picadilly Recreation; he disregards the 
inscription (written sycophantically to Septimus by Chater in hopes of a glowing review) 
as merely indicative of the fact that the book did not originally belong to Byron.  
Although Bernard’s conjecture is theoretically sound it cannot hope to accurately 
reconstruct the complex motives and actions of human beings. When Hannah suggests 
that Byron and Septimus may have been contemporaries at Trinity, Bernard is 
encouraged to dig deeper. Hannah’s discovery of a letter from Lady Croom to her 
husband discussing her brother, Captain Brice’s, marriage to Mrs. Chater in 1810 bolsters 
Bernard’s theory. When Valentine reveals that Byron’s name is in the game books for 
shooting a hare in 1809, Bernard takes this as confirmation of his theory and proceeds to 
publish. As Hannah and Valentine attempt to point out to Bernard, speculating about a 
person’s actions can be dangerous with no evidence to back it up. Exasperated, Hannah 
exclaims “[l]ook, sorry – I only meant, Byron could have borrowed the book without 
asking” (Arcadia 56). Ultimately, the only letter that would have been helpful to Bernard 
 
 
81
is burned by Septimus before anyone has a chance to read it. Septimus is eager to prove 
himself to his livid mistress because he is in love with her. His sexual attraction causes 
him to destroy (by fire) the only shred of evidence that would have cast light on 
Bernard’s case. The accusatory letters from Mr. Charter and the cautionary letter from 
Mrs. Chater are what lead Bernard to make his false Byron hypothesis. Sex is so 
powerful that even separated by a hundred and eighty years Septimus’s acts are still 
causing confusion and chaos.  
Through the garden and the characters’ relationships, Stoppard depicts the 
aesthetic and intellectual movement from classicism to romanticism39 (from human 
imposed order to embracing disorder) which mirrors the same movement made by 
classical scientists with the discovery of quantum science. A recursive element in the 
play, the garden becomes the perfect juxtaposition of the two ideologies that shape the 
play: the rational order of the Enlightenment and the sentimentality of the Romantics. 
The garden is largely discussed in 1809 by Lady Croom, who fretfully watches as Mr. 
Noakes wreaks havoc on her perfectly ordered garden, and in 1989 by Hannah Jarvis, 
who is investigating the Sidley Park hermit – her “peg for the nervous breakdown of the 
Romantic Imagination” (Arcadia 25). Lady Croom woefully pours over Mr. Noakes 
garden books, lamenting the loss of order: 
Here is the Park as it appears to us now, and here as it might be when Mr. Noakes 
has done with it. Where there is the familiar pastoral refinement of an 
                                                            
39 In a statement that strongly echoes the ethos of Hapgood, Demastes describes 
Stoppard’s personal view of romanticism as “between the classical and absurdist 
either/or, occupying a both/and landscape of interacting order and disorder eternally at 
play” (Chaos 103). 
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Englishman’s garden, here is an eruption of gloomy forest and towering crag, of 
ruins where there was never a house, of water dashing against rocks where there 
was neither spring nor a stone I could not throw the length of a cricket pitch. My 
hyacinth dell is become a haunt for hobgoblins, my Chinese bridge…usurped by a 
fallen obelisk overgrown with briars… But Sidley Park is already a picture and a 
most amiable picture too. The slopes are green and gentle. The trees are 
companionably grouped at intervals that show them to advantage. The rill is a 
serpentine ribbon unwound from the lake peaceably contained by meadows on 
which the right amount of sheep are tastefully arranged – in short, it is nature as 
God intended (Arcadia 12). 
Lady Croom detests the “eruption of gloomy forest” and the fact that her Chinese bridge 
has been “usurped by a fallen obelisk overgrown with briars”. However, Lady Croom’s 
lamentation juxtaposes (humorously) the folly in both styles. On the one hand, Lady 
Croom believes “nature as God intended” must be ordered by humans, carefully 
constructed with “the right amount of sheep… tastefully arranged”. On the other hand, 
the Romantic design represents ordered disorder (like chaos theory). Though parts of the 
design may seem silly (“ruins where there was never a house”) what is important is the 
emphasis on orderly chaos. It is for this reason Thomasina declares Mr. Noakes the 
“Emperor of Irregularity”. He masterfully combines the undetermined and the 
predetermined until the two come together to form the Romantic landscape. 
 Hannah, like Lady Croom, values the order of Classicism and after studying Mr. 
Noakes’s garden books has pegged the Sidley Hermit as the perfect symbol of “the whole 
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Romantic sham” (Arcadia 27). She disdainfully refers to Noakes’s design as “untamed 
nature in the style of Salvator Rosa. It’s the Gothic novel expressed in landscape. 
Everything but vampires” (Arcadia 25). Echoing Lady Croom, Hannah wistfully 
describes Sidley Park before Mr. Noakes’s alterations as “smooth, undulating, serpentine 
– open water, clumps of trees, classical boathouse” (Arcadia 25). Like Lady Croom, 
Hannah values order and logic and disdains the chaotic “Romantic sham”. Her work “The 
Genius of the Place: Landscape and Literature 1750 to 1834” posits the hermit of Sidley 
Park as the symbol of: 
[a] century of intellectual rigour turned in on itself. A mind in chaos suspected of 
genius. In a setting of cheap thrill and false emotion. The history of the garden 
says it all, beautifully. There’s an engraving of Sidley Park in 1730 that makes 
you want to weep. Paradise in the age of reason. By 1760 everything had gone… 
ploughed under by Capability Brown. The grass went from the doorstep to the 
horizon and the best box hedge in Derbyshire was dug up for the ha-ha so the 
fools could pretend they were living in God’s countryside. And then Richard 
Noakes came in to bring God up to date. By the time he’d finished it looked like 
this… The decline from thinking to feeling, you see. (Arcadia 27). 
Hannah’s nostalgia for the Enlightenment is barely surpassed by her disdain for 
Romanticism. She flatly tells Bernard, “I don’t like sentimentality” (Arcadia 28). Hannah 
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rejects sentimentality for reason, thinking for feeling and logic for intuition. 40Despite 
Hannah’s adherence to logic, her theory isn’t any more correct than Bernard’s.  
Stoppard emphasizes Hannah’s role as the classically sensible “Newtonian” by 
introducing Bernard Nightingale, her ideological opposite, shortly after. Bernard “wears a 
suit and tie. His tendency is to dress flamboyantly, but he has damped it down for the 
occasion, slightly. A peacock-coloured display handkerchief boils over his breast pocket. 
He carries a capacious leather bag which serves as a briefcase” (Arcadia 16).  By 
juxtaposing the two character descriptions, Stoppard is immediately pitting the thinker 
and the feeler against one another. One scene that demonstrates the disparity between the 
classical and romantic temperaments occurs during the fourth scene between Hannah and 
Bernard. Having presumably just discovered a superscription by Byron in Couch of Eros, 
Bernard is challenged by Hannah: 
Hannah: Is it his handwriting? 
Bernard: Oh, come on. 
Hannah: Obviously not. 
Bernard: Christ, what do you want? 
Hannah: Proof 
Bernard: Proof? Proof? You’d have to be there, you silly bitch! (Arcadia 49) 
Bernard’s Byron theory gains even greater steam when Hannah presents him with 
evidence confirming that Mrs. Chater remarried (insinuating that Mr. Chater had indeed 
                                                            
40 William Demastes argues “Hannah uses her mind to try to prove that Sidley Park is 
paradigmatic of the 19th century ‘decline from thinking to feeling, intimating a desire to 
use orderly thought to prove it superior to the chaos/picturesque/Romantic model, which 
she describes as the irregularity of sentiment” (Chaos 99). 
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been killed). Bernard pounces upon this shred of evidence and embraces it as definitive 
proof that his theory is true. Hannah however, true to the classical form, remains 
skeptical. “You haven’t established it was fought. You haven’t established it was Byron. 
For God’s sake, Bernard, you haven’t established Byron was even here!” (Arcadia 50). 
Although Bernard’s theory is wrong, his response to Hannah’s challenge encapsulates 
one of the central conflicts of the play: between rational thinking and intuitive feeling, 
Bernard: I’ll tell you your problem. Not guts. 
Hannah: Really? 
Bernard: By which I mean a visceral belief in yourself. Gut instinct. The part 
of you which doesn’t reason. The certainty for which there is no back-
reference. Because time is reversed. Tock, tick goes the universe and then 
recovers itself, but it was enough, you were in there and you bloody know. 
(Arcadia 50) 
Although Bernard may be as wrong about time being able to flow backwards as he is 
about Byron, his assertion about Hannah is accurate. 
The relationship between Bernard and Hannah is not only an iteration of the 
earlier intellectual seekers (Septimus and Thomasina) it also juxtaposes classical and 
romantic ideologies.41  Hannah seeks to expose the Romantic sham and Bernard seeks to 
expose the dark motive for Byron’s (Bernard’s hero and the face of Romanticism) trip to 
Lisbon. The difference between the two is introduced in their character descriptions. 
                                                            
41 Zeifman references Stoppard who has said he wanted “to write about the contrast 
between the classical temperament (“those who have particular respect for logic, 
geometry and pattern”) and the romantic temperament (“those with a much more 
spontaneous, unstructured communion with nature”) (qtd. in Zeifman 186). 
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Pragmatic Hannah is introduced wearing “nothing frivolous. Her shoes are suitable for 
the garden” (Arcadia 15). If Hannah represents the classical mindset, Bernard positively 
champions Romanticism. Flamboyant, sensual and impulsive, Bernard constantly offends 
Hannah’s (and Valentine’s) sensibilities. He publishes impulsively, ignoring anything 
that might contradict his theory. He sensationalizes his story, titling it: ‘Even in Arcadia – 
Sex, Literature and Death at Sidley Park’. He passive -aggressively takes a swipe at 
Valentine (and his work with grouse populations) when he declares “but as we know 
now, the drama of life and death at Sidley Park was not about pigeons but about sex and 
literature” (Arcadia 56). Hannah is constantly exasperated by Bernard as he refuses to 
conform to her logical system and persistently insists on using his intuition. 
In the end gut instinct and cold rationality both fail as Bernard and Hannah 
discover their theories are wrong. Bernard’s theory is undermined by the fact that 
Septimus burns the only letter (the one from Byron that Septimus burns for Lady Croom) 
that would have shed light on the truth. Hannah’s original theory about who was the 
hermit of Sidley Park is wrong and though she discovers (or intuits) that it was Septimus, 
she has no way of proving it. By way of a magazine article she discovers that the 
thousands of pages of cabalistic proofs found in the hermitage were not mad scribbling 
but a continuation of Thomasina’s mathematical intuitions. Hannah cannot prove this 
however because the contents of the hermitage were burned dismissed as the scribblings 
of a “mind in chaos.” Despite Bernard and Hannah’s faith in their intuition and logic 
(respectively) their efforts to accurately reconstruct the past are thwarted by sex and love 
and the actions they motivate.  
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 Neither logic nor intuition stands a chance when faced with the unpredictabilities 
of human action and choice – especially when it comes to love and sex. Bernard’s 
intuition cannot recover the complex and unpredictable sexual motivations of character’s 
in the past. By focusing on one sexual liaison (Byron and Mrs. Chater) Bernard ignores 
the numerous other possible liaisons, which in the end significantly affect his theory. 
Hannah presumes the hermit is a fixture; placed there as a part of the ludicrous Romantic 
aesthetic, like the ruins and the obelisk. That love is a factor never dawns on Hannah. 
Septimus becomes the hermit and toils to extend Thomasina’s algorithm because he is 
tortured by her death. He is not mad as everyone (including Hannah at first) accuses him 
of being; he is heartbroken. The realization is humbling to Hannah as she discovers that 
even she is not immune to the transformative forces of chaos or love, and as the play 
progresses she slowly learns to rely less on her own intellect and more on her feelings. 
By the end of the play Hannah (who has repeatedly stated her opposition to romance, 
sentimentality and relationships in general42)  lets her guard down and allows Gus to take 
her in his arms and lead her in a waltz as the piano faintly plays from the next room.  
The iterative and recursive nature of the plot and action reflects the self-
organizing and regenerative qualities of chaotic systems and demonstrates how sensitive 
such systems are to unknown variables. In Arcadia, the characters become the unknown 
variables and it is through their actions that the plot is able to regenerate itself. Stoppard 
infuses his play with aspects of modern science in such a way that foregrounds the 
                                                            
42 “What the hell is it with you people?  Chaps sometimes wanted to marry me, and I 
don’t know a worse bargain.  Available sex against not being allowed to fart in bed” 
(Arcadia 63). 
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importance and significance of human action. Their actions have the ability to create 
chaos or to unearth order from the disorder around them. By demonstrating the potential 
power of human action, Stoppard makes his argument that humans are not merely 
affected by the chaotic inclinations of nature; rather they are a fundamental part of it. 
 The argument between Valentine and Bernard crystallizes the opposition between 
Classicism and Romanticism and brings the question of triviality into play. As the 
rational Hannah and Valentine try to make Bernard see the holes in his theory, Bernard 
and Valentine clash over the issue of triviality: 
Bernard: (Jeering) Parameters! You can’t stick Byron’s head in your lap top!  
Genius isn’t like your average grouse. 
 Valentine: (Casually) Well, it’s all trivial anyway. 
 Bernard: What is? 
 Valentine: Who wrote what when… 
 Bernard: Trivial? 
 Valentine: Personalities. 
 Bernard: I’m sorry – did you say trivial? 
 Valentine: It’s a technical term. 
 Bernard: Not where I come from, it isn’t (Arcadia 60). 
Valentine defends his position arguing that it doesn’t matter who got there first – what 
matters is the knowledge acquired. Bernard explodes: “But don’t confuse progress with 
perfectibility. A great poet is always timely. A great philosopher is an urgent need. 
There’s no rush for Isaac Newton. We were quite happy with Aristotle’s cosmos. 
Personally, I preferred it” (Arcadia 61).  Valentine values the cold rationality of science, 
 
 
89
indifferent to the complexities of personality and sturdily factual in its testability. Bernard 
values the individuality of artistic expression, utterly absorbed in the complexity of 
personality, incapable of being computer generated.43 
It is Valentine, the modern day chaotician who is able to create order out of 
Thomasina’s discovery. Generations later, what were considered mad scribblings are now 
part of a new science that is revolutionizing the accepted world view and the role of 
people in it. Through Valentine, Stoppard explains not only the complexities of chaos 
theory but the importance of Thomasina’s discovery and why she was never able to get it 
to “square back to sense”: 
Hannah: What I don’t understand is… why nobody did this feedback thing before 
– it’s not like relativity, you don’t have to be Einstein. 
Valentine: You couldn’t see to look before. The electronic calculator was what 
the telescope was for Galileo. 
Hannah: Calculator? 
Valentine: There wasn’t enough time before. There weren’t enough pencils! (He 
flourishes Thomasina’s lesson book.) This took her I don’t know how 
many days and she hasn’t scratched the paintwork. Now she’d only have 
to press a button, the same button over and over. Iteration. A few minutes. 
And what I’ve done in a couple of months, with only a pencil the 
calculations would take me the rest of my life to do again – thousands of 
pages – tens of thousands! And so boring (Arcadia 51). 
                                                            
43 Thomasina’s “genius” on the other hand depends on the computer in order to reach full 
realization. 
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Thomasina is limited; there is not enough room or time to extend her “rabbit equation”. It 
is through her equation that Thomasina intuits that order can arise out of disorder. 
  Intellectual curiosity bridges the gap between the two time periods; despite 
differences in ideology and practice, the intellectual seekers in Arcadia all have the same 
goal: to create order out of their disordered universe. Hannah assumes a modern (and 
quantum) position that values the trivial and it’s potential. Hannah identifies the desire 
and the active search to discover truth to be the most significant facet of our experience. 
Hannah articulates the importance of the trivial, intellectual curiousity and the human 
experience: 
It’s all trivial – your grouse, my hermit, Bernard’s Byron. Comparing what we’re 
looking for misses the point. It’s wanting to know that makes us matter. 
Otherwise we’re going out the way we came in… (Arcadia 76). 
The most thrilling aspect of this universal search is that, as Uncertainty Principle 
suggests, we will never completely understand mysteries of our universe, but as long as 
intellectual seekers exist order will inevitably arise and the meaning will never be lost. As 
the plot demonstrates the trivial becomes increasingly important in a complex system. 
Although the relationships and situations are recursive, human actions (no matter how 
trivial) create asymmetries which defy prediction. 
When Thomasina first articulates her intuition about entropy (“You cannot stir 
things apart”) it is Septimus who makes the connection between the implications of 
entropy, free will and the role of human action in the universe: 
No more you can, time must needs run backward, and since it will not, we must 
stir our way onward mixing as we go, disorder out of disorder into disorder until 
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pink is complete, unchanging and unchangeable, and we are done with it forever. 
This is known as free will or self-determinism (Arcadia 5). 
Septimus intuits that the Newtonian paradigm is inimical to free will: “If everything from 
the furthest planet to the smallest atom of our brain acts according to Newton’s law of 
motion, what becomes of free will?” (Arcadia 5). Septimus sees the inherent 
incongruencies between Newtonian determinism and free will. The Newtonian paradigm 
does not work because it does not factor in the reality of free will. Quantum science on 
the other hand embraces unpredictability and therefore it embraces free will and all of the 
potential chaos it may wreak. 
 Valentine also expresses the incongruencies between reality and the Newtonian 
paradigm however he has 180 years of science to justify them: 
When your Thomasina was doing maths it had been the same maths for a couple 
of thousand years. Classical. And for a century after Thomasina. Then maths left 
the real world behind, just like modern art, really. Nature was classical, maths was 
suddenly Picassos. But now nature is having the last laugh. The freaky stuff is 
turning out to be the mathematics of the natural world (Arcadia 45). 
This “freaky stuff” which defied Newton consistently proved to be a more accurate 
representation of reality. But while the new science could describe the very big and the 
very small, the everyday remains inaccessible: 
The ordinary-sized stuff which is our lives, the things people write poetry about – 
clouds – daffodils – waterfalls – and what happens in a cup of coffee when the 
cream goes in – these things are full of mystery, as mysterious to us as the 
heavens were to the Greeks (Arcadia 48). 
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The occurrences of the everyday, including human actions, remain as inexplicable and 
unpredictable as the cosmos were to the Greeks. As Thomasina intuits, chaos theory 
finally offers an explanation of the most mysteriously banal elements of everyday life. 
Septimus absent mindedly replies to Thomasina’s insistence that traditional mathematics 
is ill-equipped to depict the realities of the world around them: “He [God] has a mastery 
of equations which lead into infinities where we cannot follow” (Arcadia 37). Thomasina 
refuses to accept that the world works in a way that is understandable to God but 
inaccessible to her, “What a faint-heart! We must work outward from the middle of the 
maze” (Arcadia 37). Thomasina is not satisfied to merely cow to the divine determinism 
of classical mathematics. She realizes that as part of the system the best she can do is try 
to understand it from the inside out.  
 As the timelines converge, the implications of Thomasina’s ‘rabbit equation’ 
become clear.44 Although the inevitable implications of the second law of 
thermodynamics still apply, Thomasina’s discovery promises a possibility of renewal 
after destruction. Though the world may suffer heat death it will regenerate itself through 
its destruction: 
 Thomasina: No marks?! Did you not like my rabbit equation? 
 Septimus: I saw no resemblance to a rabbit. 
 Thomasina: It eats its own progeny. 
  (Septimus and Hannah turn the pages doubled by time.) 
 Hannah: Do you mean the world is saved after all? 
                                                            
44 As Nadel argues, “[t]he grand mystery Stoppard is able to present in mundane terms is 
the fate of the universe, made marvelously clear at one point through the overlapping 
conversations of Septimus, Thomasina, Hannah and Valentine” (Nadel 442). 
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 Valentine: No, it’s still doomed. But if this is how it started, perhaps it’s how the 
next one will come. 
 Hannah: From good English algebra? 
 Septimus: It will go to infinity or zero, or nonsense. 
 Thomasina: No, if you set apart the minus they square back to sense (Arcadia  
77-78). 
Through her ‘rabbit equation’ Thomasina intuits how order can arise out of disorder. 
What has been lost will be recovered.  
Septimus makes a similar observation about the inevitable recovery of knowledge 
earlier in the play while discussing the burning of the Library at Alexandria with 
Thomasina. Though Thomasina mourns the intellectual loss, Septimus reassures her that 
all will be restored:  
We shed as we pick up, like travellers who must carry everything in their arms, 
and what we let fall will be picked up by those behind. The procession is very 
long and life is very short. We die on the march. But there is nothing outside the 
march so nothing can be lost to it. The missing plays of Sophocles will turn up 
piece by piece, or be written again in another language. Ancient cures for diseases 
will reveal themselves once more. Mathematical discoveries glimpsed and lost to 
view will have their time again (Arcadia 38). 
Septimus’ observation is made ever more poignant by Thomasina’s death by fire at the 
end of the play. Although Thomasina tragically loses her life, her ideas and her work are 
not lost with it. Through Septimus’s dedication to her vision, Valentine and Hannah are 
able to recover what has been lost: the brilliant mind of Thomasina Coverly. 
 
 
94
 In the final scene, the timelines converge once more; this superposition of 
timelines becomes even further complicated by the fact that the characters in the modern 
period have put on Regency dress for a party. For the first time not only is the set 
indistinguishable from one time period to the next but the characters become harder to 
place. It is possible to identify them with their period due to which characters interact 
with which and our previous experience however it is arguably harder to separate the 
two. The audience is faced with the future superimposed on the past. This 
superimposition is compounded by the fact that the characters in the past and in the 
present are all discussing Thomasina’s discovery: 
  (Septimus and Valentine study the diagram doubled by time.) 
 Valentine: It’s heat. 
 Hannah: Are you tight, Val? 
 Valentine: It’s a diagram of heat exchange. 
 Septimus: So, we are all doomed! 
 Thomasina: (Cheerfully) Yes. 
 Valentine: Like a steam engine, you see – (Hannah fills Septimus’s glass from the 
same decanter, and sips from it.) She didn’t have the maths, not remotely. 
She saw what things meant, way ahead, like seeing a picture (Arcadia 93). 
Thomasina articulates her vision despite the fact that she doesn’t have any mathematical 
expressions to affirm what she intuits about heat and ultimately the universe: 
 Hannah: What did she see? 
 Valentine: That you can’t run the film backwards. Heat was the first thing which 
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didn’t work that way. Not like Newton. A film of a pendulum, or a ball 
falling through the air – backwards, it looks the same. 
 Hannah: The ball would be going the wrong way. 
Valentine: You’d have to know that. But with heat – friction – a ball 
breaking a window - 
 Hannah: Yes. 
 Valentine: It won’t work backwards. 
 Hannah: Who thought it did? 
 Valentine: She saw why. You can put back the bits of glass but you can’t collect 
up the heat of the smash. It’s gone. 
Septimus: So the Improved Newtonian Universe must cease and grow cold. Dear 
me (Arcadia 93). 
What Thomasina realized was that in the universe (like in her porridge) “the heat goes 
into the mix” (Arcadia 94). Valentine articulates the cosmic significance: “(He gestures 
to indicate the air in the room, in the universe) And everything is mixing the same way, 
all the time, irreversibly” (Arcadia 94). Perhaps one of the most powerful moments in the 
play, the two timelines hang in a suspended superimposition of states as the characters in 
both realize the implications of Thomasina’s discovery. This scene is imbued with a 
heightened level of urgency as the audience realizes they are seeing Thomasina on the 
eve of her seventeenth birthday and her death. The papers Septimus is poring over will in 
fact drive him to become the mad hermit after Thomasina’s untimely demise. His 
subsequent scribbling will eventually lead Hannah and Valentine to re-discover 
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Thomasina’s work. Although Thomasina’s brilliance is lost with her in the fire, her 
thoughts live on through Septimus and are regenerated in the present. 
 It is Thomasina who gives hope to the audience and the characters in the face of 
her (and the universe’s) impending doom: 
 Septimus: When we have found all the mysteries and lost all the meaning, we will 
be alone on an empty shore. 
 Thomasina: Then we will dance (Arcadia 94). 
Thomasina realizes that although death (of the self or universe) is inevitable so is 
regeneration. Death does not have to be the end. Even as the universe continues to slowly 
cool, it is out of this process that the next will come. Nothing is ever truly lost. What else 
is one to do but dance? The image of the two dancing couples, waltzing in unison across 
time remains an image of hope for the audience. 45 Although Thomasina will surely go to 
her death once the dance is done, her work and her love will not be lost. Septimus, out of 
love, toils to extend Thomasina’s algorithm. It is his work which brings Hannah to Sidley 
Park, where she meets Gus who innocently falls in love. Through her work with 
Valentine and Bernard, Hannah discovers her Romantic side and letting go of her staunch 
un-sentimentality opens herself to Gus’s love. Disorder regenerates into order; love that 
is lost in 1812 is restored in 1989. Though order inevitably becomes disorder, the quest 
for knowledge is not futile. Intellectual curiosity is the driving force of order in an 
otherwise chaotic world. These seekers of order and truth give meaning to an otherwise 
senseless universe. Like strange attractors their repeated attempts at finding order create 
                                                            
45 Nadel posits that “the dance is the triumphant, visual celebration of Thomasina’s early 
observation that things cannot be stirred apart, set against the inescapable backdrop of the 
dissipation of energy” (Nadel 433). 
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an overarching pattern that gives us meaning and purpose. There is always the hope of 
coming order, even in the face of crippling disorder. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Color my life with the chaos of trouble. Cause anything’s better than posh isolation. 
Belle and Sebastian46 
 
 In Rosencrantz and Guildenstern, Hapgood, and Arcadia, Tom Stoppard is not 
merely juxtaposing quantum science and human interactions for the sake of drama; rather 
by excavating the complexities of human action, choice and identity through the lens of 
chaos theory and quantum science, Stoppard demonstrates the fundamental connection 
between individuals and the post-Newtonian world. Although Heisenberg’s Uncertainty 
Principle dispels any hope of complete knowledge of our universe, chaos theory at least 
gives us the hope of influence. As Guil desperately proclaims: we have influence. 
Though we cannot know anything with complete certainty we do know that we have the 
opportunity to act. and with that action potentially change the world and the people 
around us. Stoppard puts the universe back in the hands of his characters who, like 
everyone, struggle with questions of certainty and prediction.  By creating dramatic 
situations which parallel or are infused with the principles of quantum science, Stoppard 
demonstrates the power of their, and by association our, actions in the universe. Guil 
condemns himself, and Ros, when he chooses not to act after discovering Hamlet’s death 
sentence. Blair, crippled by his ‘either/or’ mentality, forces Hapgood to act (by leaving) 
after he puts her son in harm’s way. Sexual desire drives Arcadia’s plot as the effects of 
characters’ actions and choices reverberate across almost two centuries. As Stoppard 
                                                            
46 (Belle and Sebastian xvii/xviii)  
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demonstrates, humans create just as much chaos through their actions as they are subject 
to by nature. Chaos theory demonstrates the importance of trivialities, including human 
actions and choice, suggesting that whether or not there is an omnipotent being keeping 
watch, human actions have very real and unpredictable consequences in our universe. 
Chaos theory throws off the shackles of scientific and spiritual determinism. Humans are 
not victims of the chaotic universe; rather they are a fundamental part of it. Their actions 
create a ripple effect which reverberates throughout the universe with incalculable and 
unpredictable effects. 
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